Abstract
In our daily life, players may reduce their cooperation levels for various reasons. This paper studies how to evaluate and allocate the cooperation payoff when the players cooperate partially. Different from previous research that directly uses the cooperation level to calculate the payoffs of fuzzy coalitions, we introduce the concept of dual fuzzy cooperative games, where the payoffs of fuzzy coalitions equal the difference between the original payoff and the lost payoff caused by the decline of the cooperation level. Meanwhile, the dual Shapley value is introduced, and its axiomatic systems are studied. Further, a special kind of dual fuzzy cooperative game with Choquet integral form is presented. Finally, we provide an application of dual fuzzy cooperative games in the manufacturer–retailer supply chain to allocate the payoff for vertical co-op advertising.



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Notes
Note: “\(\vee\)” and “\(\wedge\)” indicate maximum and minimum, respectively.
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Acknowledgements
The National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 72371134), the Ministry of Education Humanities and Social Science Foundation of China (No. 22YJ630061), the Natural Science Foundation of Changsha in China (No. kq2202112), and the Startup Foundation for Introducing Talent of NUIST (No. 2022r059).
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Appendices
Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 2
Existence. Similar to Shapley [22], the detail proofs are omitted.
Uniqueness. Similar to traditional cooperative games, we have \(v^{D} = \sum\limits_{\emptyset \ne T \subseteq U} {c_{T}^{D} u_{T} }\), where
and \(u_{T} (S) = \left\{ \begin{gathered} 1\;\;\;\;\;S \subseteq T \hfill \\ 0\;\;\;\;{\text{otherwise}} \hfill \\ \end{gathered} \right.\).
Let \(c_{{{\text{Supp}} T}} = \sum\limits_{{{\text{Supp}} S \subseteq {\text{Supp}} T}} {( - 1)^{{\left| {{\text{Supp}} T} \right| - \left| {{\text{Supp}} S} \right|}} v(1^{{{\text{Supp}} S}} )}\) and \(c_{{T^{D} }} = \sum\limits_{{S^{D} \subseteq T^{D} }} {( - 1)^{{\left| {{\text{Supp}} T^{D} } \right| - \left| {{\text{Supp}} S^{D} } \right|}} v(S^{D} )}\) for any \(T \subseteq U\), we have \(v^{D} = \sum\limits_{\emptyset \ne T \subseteq U} {\left( {c_{{{\text{Supp}} T}} - c_{{T^{D} }} } \right)u_{T} }\). From DFA, we need to prove the conclusion on the fuzzy unanimity game \(u_{T}\), i.e.,\(f^{D} (U,u_{T} ) = Sh^{D} (U,u_{T} )\). By DFC and DFS, we have \(f_{i}^{D} (U,u_{T} ) = \left\{ {\begin{array}{*{20}c} {\frac{1}{{\left| {{\text{Supp}} T} \right|}}} & {i \in {\text{Supp}} T} \\ 0 & {i \in {\text{Supp}} T} \\ \end{array} } \right.\).
On the other hand, we obtain \(Sh_{i}^{D} (U,u_{T} ) = \left\{ {\begin{array}{*{20}c} {\frac{1}{{\left| {{\text{Supp}} T} \right|}}} & {i \in {\text{Supp}} T} \\ 0 & {i \in {\text{Supp}} T} \\ \end{array} } \right.\) by Eq. (8). Therefore,\(Sh^{D} = f^{D}\).□
Appendix B
Proof of Theorem 3
Existence. \(Sh^{D}\) obviously satisfies DFE. Next, we show that \(Sh^{D}\) owns DFBC, namely
for all \(i,j \in {\text{Supp}} U\) with \(i \ne j\).
According to Theorem A in [6], we have
for all \(i,j \in {\text{Supp}} U\) with \(i \ne j\).
Therefore, we need to show
for all \(i,j \in {\text{Supp}} U\) with \(i \ne j\).
From Eq. (1), we know
Since the above expression is symmetric for i and j, we can similarly derive this expression for \(Sh_{j} (U^{D} ,v) - Sh_{j} (U^{D} \backslash U^{D} (i),v)\). Therefore, DFBC holds.
Uniqueness. Let \(U \in L(N)\) and \(v^{D} \in DG(N)\). For any \(U \in L(N)\), if \(\left| {SuppU} \right| = 1\), without loss of generality, let U = {U(i)}. By DFE, we have.
\(f^{D} (U,v^{D} ) = f_{i} (1^{{{\text{Supp}} U}} ,v) - f_{i} (U^{D} ,v) = v(1^{{{\text{Supp}} U(i)}} ) - v(U^{D} (i)) = Sh_{i} (1^{{{\text{Supp}} U(i)}} ,v) - Sh_{i} (U^{D} ,v)\).
Assume that \(f^{D} = Sh^{D}\) when \(\left| {{\text{Supp}} U} \right| \le n - 1\)(\(n \ge 2\)). Next, we prove that the conclusion is true when \(\left| {{\text{Supp}} U} \right| = n\). By DFBC, we obtain
for all \(i,j \in {\text{Supp}} U\) with\(i \ne j\).
By assumption, we get
Because \(Sh^{D}\) satisfies DFBC, from Eq. (a.1) we have namely
From Eq. (a.2), we derive
Take the sum for \(j \in {\text{Supp}} U\), we obtain
Therefore,\(f_{i}^{D} (U,v^{D} ) = Sh_{i}^{D} (U,v^{D} )\) for all \(i \in {\text{Supp}} U\), and the conclusion is true. □
Appendix C
Proof of Theorem 3
Existence. By Eq. (8), STPDFG holds. Next, let us show that \(Sh_{i} (1^{{{\text{Supp}} U}} ,v) - Sh_{i} (U^{D} ,v) =\) \(Sh_{i} (1^{{{\text{Supp}} R}} ,v^{{f,1^{{{\text{Supp}} R}} }} ) - Sh_{i} (R^{D} ,v^{{f,R^{D} }} )\) for any \(R \subseteq U\) and any \(i \in {\text{Supp}} R\). From Theorem B in [6], we know that \(Sh_{i} (1^{{{\text{Supp}} U}} ,v) = Sh_{i} (1^{{{\text{Supp}} S}} ,v^{{f,1^{{{\text{Supp}} R}} }} )\). Therefore, we just need to show that \(Sh_{i} (U^{D} ,v) = Sh_{i} (S^{D} ,v^{{f,S^{D} }} )\).
From the linearity of \(Sh(U^{D} ,v)\) and \(v = \sum\limits_{{\emptyset \ne T^{D} \subseteq U^{D} }} {c_{{T^{D} }} u_{{T^{D} }} }\), where \(c_{{T^{D} }} = \sum\limits_{{S^{D} \subseteq T^{D} }} {( - 1)^{{\left| {{\text{Supp}} T^{D} } \right| - \left| {{\text{Supp}} S^{D} } \right|}} v(S^{D} )}\) and \(u_{{T^{D} }} (S^{D} ) = \left\{ \begin{gathered} 1,\;\;\;\;\;S^{D} \subseteq T^{D} \hfill \\ 0\;\;\;\;\;{\text{otherwise}} \hfill \\ \end{gathered} \right.\). We need to prove the conclusion on the fuzzy unanimity game \(u_{{T^{D} }}\). Take \(u_{{T^{D} }}\) such that \(T^{D} \subseteq U^{D}\) and \(R^{D} \subseteq U^{D}\). By Definition 10, we know that
for any \(Q^{D} \subseteq R^{D}\).
If \({\text{Supp}} (T^{D} \wedge R^{D} ) = \emptyset\), then \(T^{D} \subseteq (R^{D} )^{c}\). For any \(Q^{D} \subseteq R^{D}\), we have
Thus,\(u_{{T^{D} }}^{{Sh,R^{D} }} (Q^{D} ) \equiv 0\) for any \(Q^{D} \subseteq R^{D}\). Further,\(Sh_{i} (R^{D} ,u_{{T^{D} }}^{{Sh,R^{D} }} ) = Sh_{i} (U^{D} ,u_{{T^{D} }} ) = 0\) for any \(i \in {\text{Supp}} R^{D}\).
If \({\text{Supp}} (T^{D} \wedge R^{D} ) \ne \emptyset\), then, for any \(Q^{D} \subseteq R^{D}\) with \(T^{D} \wedge R^{D} \subseteq Q^{D}\), we have
For any \(Q^{D} \subseteq R^{D}\) with \(T^{D} \wedge R^{D} \not\subset Q^{D}\), we get
Thus,
Therefore, \(Sh_{i} (R^{D} ,u_{{T^{D} }}^{{Sh,R^{D} }} ) = \left\{ \begin{gathered} \frac{1}{{\left| {{\text{Supp}} T^{D} } \right|}},\;\;\;\;i \in {\text{Supp}} (R^{D} \wedge T^{D} ) \hfill \\ 0,\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;i \in {\text{Supp}} (R^{D} \backslash T^{D} )\;\; \hfill \\ \end{gathered} \right. = Sh_{i} (U^{D} ,u_{{T^{D} }} )\) for all \(i \in {\text{Supp}} R^{D}\).
Uniqueness. From DFE, we obtain
If \(\left| {{\text{Supp}} U} \right| = 1\), we show that \(f_{i}^{D} (U(i),v^{D} ) = f_{i} (1^{SuppU(i)} ,v) - f_{i} (U^{D} (i),v) = v(1^{{{\text{Supp}}U(i)}} ) - v(U^{D} (i)) = v^{D} (U(i))\). Let \(v(1^{{{\text{Supp}} U(i)}} ) - v(U^{D} (i)) = \delta\). We consider the game \((\{ U(i),U(j)\} ,v^{D} )\), where \(i \ne j\), such that \(v^{D} (U(i)) = v^{D} (\{ U(i),U(j)\} ) = \delta\) and \(v^{D} (U(j)) = 0\).
By STPDFG, we derive \(f_{i}^{D} (\{ U(i),U(j)\} ,v^{D} ) = f_{i} (1^{{{\text{Supp}} \{ U(i),U(j)\} }} ,v) - f_{i} (\{ U^{D} (i),U^{D} (j)\} ,v) = \delta\) and \(f_{j}^{D} (\{ U(i),U(j)\} ,v^{D} ) =\)\(f_{j} (1^{{{\text{Supp}} \{ U(i),U(j)\} }} ,v) - f_{j} (\{ U^{D} (i),U^{D} (j)\} ,v) = 0\). Hence,
From the consistency, we have
Thus, \(f_{i}^{D} (U(i),v^{D} ) = v^{D} (U(i))\).
This indeed holds for \(\left| {{\text{Supp}} U} \right| = 2\) by the property of STPDFG. Let \(\left| {{\text{Supp}} U} \right| \ge 3\). Assume that
for \(v^{D}\) with less than \(\left| {{\text{Supp}} U} \right|\) players, when there are \(\left| {{\text{Supp}} U} \right|\) players. By DFC, we have
By assumption,\(f^{D}\) satisfies DFE when there are \(\left| {{\text{Supp}} U} \right| - 1\) players.
Thus, the above equation can be written as
According to Definition 10, we obtain \(\sum\limits_{{i \in {\text{Supp}} U}} {f_{i}^{D} (U,v^{D} )} = v^{D} \left( U \right)\). Thus, DFE holds for \(f^{D}\).
If \(\left| {{\text{Supp}} U} \right| = 2\), by STPDFG we derive
and
for all \(i,j \in {\text{Supp}} U\) such that \(i \ne j\).
From Eqs. (a.3) and (a.4), we get
We assume that \(f^{D} = Sh^{D}\) for vD with \(\left| {{\text{Supp}} U} \right| - 1\) players. Now, we show that \(f^{D} = Sh^{D}\) for vD with \(\left| {{\text{Supp}} U} \right|\) players. For each fuzzy coalition \(R \subseteq U\) with \(\left| {{\text{Supp}} R} \right| = 2\), by \(v_{{f^{D} ,R}}^{D}\), we denote the dual fuzzy reduced game on \({\text{Supp}} R = \{ i,j\}\) for \(f^{D}\), and by \(v_{{Sh^{D} ,R}}^{D}\), we express the reduced game for \(Sh^{D}\). Since \({\text{Supp}} R = \{ i,j\}\),\({\text{Supp}} Q = \{ i\}\), and \({\text{Supp}} (R^{c} \cup Q) = {\text{Supp}} U\backslash j\), \(v_{{f^{D} ,R}}^{D} (U(i))\) and \(v_{{Sh^{D} ,R}}^{D} (U(i))\) depend on \(f^{D}\) and \(Sh^{D}\) through dual fuzzy cooperative game vD with \(\left| {{\text{Supp}} U} \right| - 1\) players. By the induction assumption, we get
and
By DFC, we have
and
According to Eq. (a.5), the left sides of Eqs. (a.8) and (a.9) are equal to \(v_{{f^{D} ,R}}^{D} (U(i)) - v_{{f^{D} ,R}}^{D} (U(j))\) and \(v_{{Sh^{D} ,R}}^{D} (U(i)) - v_{{Sh^{D} ,R}}^{D} (U(j))\), respectively.
Equations (a.6)-(a.9) show that \(f_{i}^{D} (U,v^{D} ) - f_{j}^{D} (U,v^{D} ) = Sh_{i}^{D} (U,v^{D} ) - Sh_{j}^{D} (U,v^{D} )\). As \(\sum\limits_{{i \in {\text{Supp}} U}} {f_{i}^{D} (U,v^{D} )} = \sum\limits_{{i \in {\text{Supp}} U}} {Sh_{i}^{D} (U,v^{D} )}\), we derive \(f_{i}^{D} (U,v^{D} ) = Sh_{i}^{D} (U,v^{D} )\) for any \(i \in {\text{Supp}} U\). □
Appendix D
Proof of Theorem 7
By Eq. (10), we have
On the other hand,
Since v is supper-additive, we have \(v(1^{{{\text{Supp}} S}} ) - v(1^{{{\text{Supp}} S\backslash {\text{Supp}} S_{{h_{l} (S)}} }} ) \ge v(1^{{{\text{Supp}} S_{{h_{l} (S)}} }} )\) for any \(l = 1,2, \ldots ,q(S)\). Thus, \(v^{D,C} (S) \ge v^{C} (S)\) for any \(S \subseteq U\).□
Appendix E
Proof of Theorem 9
Existence. For DFE, we derive.
For DFBC: we need to show that
for any \(S \subseteq U\) and all \(i,j \in {\text{Supp}} S\) with \(i \ne j\).
By Theorem A in [6], we have
for any \({\text{Supp}} S \subseteq {\text{Supp}} U\) and all \(i,j \in {\text{Supp}} S\) with \(i \ne j\).
Therefore, we need to prove that
for any \(S \subseteq U\) and all \(i,j \in {\text{Supp}} S\) with \(i \ne j\).
From Eq. (2), we know that
As the above expression is symmetric for the players i and j, we can also derive the above conclusion for
Uniqueness. Let \(v^{D,C} \in DG_{C} (N)\) and \(U \in L(N)\). Assume that \(f^{D,C}\) is another solution that satisfies DFE and DFBC. If \(\left| {{\text{Supp}} U} \right|{ = }1\), by DFE, we have \(f_{i}^{D,C} (U,v^{D,C} ) = U(i)v(1^{{{\text{Supp}} U(i)}} ) = Sh_{i}^{D,C} (U,v^{D,C} )\). Assume that \(f^{D,C} = Sh^{D,C}\) with no more than \(\left| {{\text{Supp}} U} \right| = n - 1\) players, where \(n \ge 2\). Next, we prove \(f^{D,C} = Sh^{D,C}\), where \(\left| {{\text{Supp}} U} \right| = n\). By DFBC, we obtain
for all \(i,j \in {\text{Supp}} U\) with \(i \ne j\).
By induction, we get
Because \(Sh^{D,C}\) satisfies DFBC, we have
Thus,
Sum \(j \in {\text{Supp}} U\) for the above equation, we derive
Therefore, \(f_{i}^{D,C} (U,v^{D,C} ) = Sh_{i}^{D,C} (U,v^{D,C} )\) for any \(i \in {\text{Supp}} U\). □
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Tang, J., Li, Z., Meng, F. et al. The Allocations for Dual Fuzzy Cooperative Games. Int. J. Fuzzy Syst. 26, 2191–2208 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40815-024-01723-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40815-024-01723-1