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Benchmarking of Hardware Trojans and Maliciously Affected Circuits

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Abstract

Research in the field of hardware Trojans has seen significant growth in the past decade. However, standard benchmarks to evaluate hardware Trojans and their detection are lacking. To this end, we have developed a suite of Trojans and ‘trust benchmarks’ (i.e., benchmark circuits with a hardware Trojan inserted in them) that can be used by researchers in the community to compare and contrast various Trojan detection techniques. In this paper, we present a comprehensive vulnerability analysis flow at various levels of abstraction of digital-design, that has been utilized to create these trust benchmarks. Further, we present a detailed evaluation of our benchmarks in terms of metrics such as Trojan detectability, and in the context of different attack models. Finally, we discuss future work such as automatic Trojan insertion into any arbitrary circuit.

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Acknowledgments

This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation (NSF) under grant 1513239.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. ECE Department, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, 32611, USA

    Bicky Shakya, Tony He, Domenic Forte, Swarup Bhunia & Mark Tehranipoor

  2. ECE Department, Howard University, Washington, DC, 20059, USA

    Hassan Salmani

Authors
  1. Bicky Shakya
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  2. Tony He
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  3. Hassan Salmani
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  4. Domenic Forte
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  5. Swarup Bhunia
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  6. Mark Tehranipoor
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Correspondence to Bicky Shakya.

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Shakya, B., He, T., Salmani, H. et al. Benchmarking of Hardware Trojans and Maliciously Affected Circuits. J Hardw Syst Secur 1, 85–102 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41635-017-0001-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s41635-017-0001-6

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