Abstract
Security is increasingly widespread in many embedded devices. As technology scales, fault attacks are seen as becoming more relevant to many embedded devices, revealing secrets utilized within the silicon. Despite numerous publications in fault injection, laser fault injection methodologies remain diverse with limited details on equipment and setups. A new laser fault injection methodology is proposed which combines quiescent photon emissions with backside dynamic laser pulse profiling in time and space. Empirical results illustrate the impact of the laser on multiple-instruction fault injections, and controlled instruction replacement faults. Unlike previous research, quiescent photon emissions combined with laser fault injection provides fine tuning of faulty instructions in addition to reverse engineering within each clock cycle. This research is critical for understanding how to design more secure and trustworthy hardware, including countermeasures to thwart attacks.

















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Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Prof. Donna Strickland for her valuable insights on various laser measurements.
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This study was financially supported in part by grants from NSERC and XtremeEDA Corp.
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Amin, K., Gebotys, C., Faraj, M. et al. Analysis of Dynamic Laser Injection and Quiescent Photon Emissions on an Embedded Processor. J Hardw Syst Secur 4, 55–67 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41635-020-00090-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s41635-020-00090-1