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Key Update Countermeasure for Correlation-Based Side-Channel Attacks

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Abstract

Side-channel analysis is a non-invasive form of attack that reveals the secret key of the cryptographic circuit by analyzing the leaked physical information. The traditional brute-force and cryptanalysis attacks target the weakness in the encryption algorithm, whereas side-channel attacks use statistical models such as differential analysis and correlation analysis on the leaked information gained from the cryptographic device during the run-time. As a non-invasive and passive attack, the side-channel attack brings a lot of difficulties for detection and defense. In this work, we propose a key update scheme as a countermeasure for power and electromagnetic analysis-based attacks on the cryptographic device. The proposed countermeasure utilizes a secure coprocessor to provide secure key generation and storage in a trusted environment. The experimental results show that the proposed key update scheme can mitigate side-channel attacks significantly.

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Funding

This research has been sponsored by the National Science Foundation under Grant Nos. 1814420, 1819694, and 1819687.

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  1. The University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, NC, 28223, USA

    Yutian Gui, Suyash Mohan Tamore, Ali Shuja Siddiqui & Fareena Saqib

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  1. Yutian Gui
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Correspondence to Yutian Gui.

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Gui, Y., Tamore, S.M., Siddiqui, A.S. et al. Key Update Countermeasure for Correlation-Based Side-Channel Attacks. J Hardw Syst Secur 4, 167–179 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41635-020-00094-x

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