Abstract
Electronic components may contain sensitive data, either on the storage chip or on the microprocessor. Deliberate and precise perturbation of their operation or measurement of their activity through auxiliary channels can be used to extract the secrets they contain. For these reasons, it is important that the integrity of the integrated circuit is ensured. It is therefore necessary to implement protection mechanisms against threats such as physical attacks. In this paper, we present a new device for protection against and supervision of fault injection and electromagnetic listening attacks. It allows the detection of several types of physical attacks and provides an appropriate response for each type of threat.
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ChaXa: A new approach for hardware protection.
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Gaine, C., Nikolovski, JP., Aboulkassimi, D. et al. Active Shielding Against Physical Attacks by Observation and Fault Injection: ChaXa. J Hardw Syst Secur 7, 1–10 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41635-023-00131-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s41635-023-00131-5