Skip to main content
Springer Nature Link
Log in

Human rights for robots? A literature review

  • Review
  • Published:
AI and Ethics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This literature review of the most prominent academic and non-academic publications in the last 10 years on the question of whether intelligent robots should be entitled to human rights is the first review of its kind in the academic context. We review three challenging academic contributions and six non-academic but important popular texts in blogs, magazines, and newspapers which are also frequently cited in academia. One of the main findings is that several authors base their critical views (i.e. views against recognizing human rights for robots) on misleading ethical and philosophical assumptions and hence offer flawed arguments regarding the moral and legal status of artificial intelligent robots and their possible claims to human rights. Our analysis sheds light on some of the complex and challenging issues related to the crucial question of whether intelligent robots with human-like capabilities are eventually entitled to human rights (or not).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
$34.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Explore related subjects

Discover the latest articles, news and stories from top researchers in related subjects.

Notes

  1. In the context of machines, it is important to distinguish between artificial narrow intelligence (ANI), which can be already attributed to machines which are excellent at one particular task such as playing chess or Go, and artificial general intelligence (AGI), which can be considered the very foundation of any human-like machine since it would give such a machine the capability to become an intelligent person who understands and learns like human beings. At this moment, no AGI machines exist and whether they ever will exist remains a matter of debate. For the purposes of this paper, we assume that the technological problems related to the creation of AGI machines can be resolved.

  2. “I note that in my argument below, based upon ontological distinctions, animals and humans would fall into the same pertinent ontological category and automata in another, so this argument challenges arguments for automata rights based upon the fact that humans have recognized the need for animal welfare or rights, as there would still be a need to account for the ontological leap from animals/humans to automata “ [14, p. 372].

  3. Wright argues that to deserve constitutional rights, one must have the capacity to meaningfully, subjectively, and genuinly care about the application, waiver or violation of that right [19, p. 624]. According to him, a robot’s knowledge that it may be permanently switched off does not give it the right not to be switched off, if the robot lacks any relevant plans or aspirations that could be blocked by turning it off.

  4. Paola Cavalieri and Singer [23] initiated the so-called Great Ape project, which aimed to extend the moral circle beyond humanity so as to also include the great apes. Their main goal was to grant some basic rights to the non-human great apes—in particular the rights to life, liberty and freedom from torture.

  5. We hold the view that human rights were not invented by human beings but were, rather, discovered by humans through means of reasoning. Of course, the milestone in the history of human rights is their codification in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), but it seems reasonable to hold the view that they existed (at least in some version) long before that time [29].

  6. In our reading of Kamm, the importance of consciousness in the definition of moral status concerns the ability to reason. An individual can be conscious without having the ability to reason, but not vice versa. A being with full moral personhood, such as a typical adult human being, has the highest moral status, which commonly requires the ability to reason.

References

  1. Müller, V., Bostrom, N.: Future progress in artificial intelligence: a survey of expert opinion. In: Müller, V.C. (ed.) Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence, pp. 552–572. Springer, Berlin (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Kurzweil, R.: The Singularity Is Near. Duckworth Overlook, London (2005)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Bostrom, N.: Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers. Strategies. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Gordon, J.-S.: Human rights. In: Pritchard, D. (ed.) Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2016)

    Google Scholar 

  5. Gordon, J.-S.: Artificial moral and legal personhood, pp. 1–15. AI & Society (2020).. (Online First)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Singer, P.: Speciesism and moral status. Metaphilosophy 40(3–4), 567–581 (2009)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Singer, P.: The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress. Princeton University Press, Princeton (2011)

    Book  Google Scholar 

  8. Cavalieri, P.: The Animal Question. Why Non-Human Animals Deserve Human Rights. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2001)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Donaldson, S., Kymlicka, W.: Zoopolis. A Political Theory of Animal Rights. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2013)

    Google Scholar 

  10. Atapattu, S.: Human Rights Approaches to Climate Change: Challenges and Opportunities. Routledge, New York (2015)

    Book  Google Scholar 

  11. Gunkel, D.J.: Robot Rights. MIT Press, Cambridge (2018)

    Book  Google Scholar 

  12. Gellers, J.: Rights for Robots. Artificial Intelligence, Animal and Environmental Law. Routledge, London (2020)

    Book  Google Scholar 

  13. Gordon, J.-S.: What do we owe to intelligent robots? AI oc. 35, 209–223 (2020)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  14. Miller, L.F.: Granting automata human rights: challenge to a basis of full-rights privilege. Hum. Rts. Rev. 16(4), 369–391 (2015)

    Google Scholar 

  15. Voiculescu, N.: I, robot! The lawfulness of a dichotomy: human rights v. bobots’ rights. In: Ispas, P.E., Maxim, F. (eds.) Romanian Law 30 Years after the Collapse of Communism, pp. 3–14. “Titu Maiorescu University,” Bucharest (2020)

    Google Scholar 

  16. European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice: The European Ethical Charter on the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Judicial Systems and Their Environment, Strasbourg, 3–4 December 2018 https://www.coe.int/en/web/cepej/cepej-european-ethical-charter-on-the-use-of-artificial-intelligence-ai-in-judicial-systems-and-their-environment Accessed 7 Mar 2021

  17. European Parliament: Resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2015/2103(INL) (2013) Accessed 7 Mar 2021

  18. European Commission: The Ethical Guidelines for Reliable Artificial Intelligence (AI), Brussels https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/ethics-guidelines-trustworthy-ai (2019) Accessed 7 Mar 2021

  19. Wright, R.G.: The constitutional rights of advanced robots (and of human beings). Ark. Law Rev. 71(3), 613–646 (2019)

    Google Scholar 

  20. Knapp, A.: Should artificial intelligences be granted civil rights? Forbes. http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexknapp/2011/04/04/should-artificial-intelligences-be-granted-civil-rights/#82578c277b2b (2011) Accessed 7 Mar 2021

  21. Worzel, R.: Should robots have rights? Future Search. https://www.futuresearch.com/2014/06/09/should-robots-have-rights/ (2004) Accessed 7 Mar 2021

  22. Singer, P.: Animal Liberation. Avon Books, London (1975)

    Google Scholar 

  23. Cavalieri, P., Singer, P.: The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond Humanity. St. Martin’s Press, New York (1993)

    Google Scholar 

  24. Ashrafian, H.: Intelligent robots must uphold human rights. Nature 519(7544), 391 (2015)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  25. Sigfusson, L.: Do robots deserve human rights? The Crux. https://www.discovermagazine.com/technology/do-robots-deserve-human-rights (5 December, 2017) Accessed 7 Mar 2021

  26. Dvorsky, G.: When will robots deserve human rights? Gizmodo. https://gizmodo.com/when-will-robots-deserve-human-rights-1794599063 (2017). Accessed 7 Mar 2021

  27. Peng, J.: How human is AI and should AI be granted rights? https://blogs.cuit.columbia.edu/jp3864/2018/12/04/how-human-is-ai-and-should-ai-be-granted-rights/ (4 December, 2018) Accessed 7 Mar 2021

  28. Ord, T.: The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity. Hachette Books, London (2020)

    Google Scholar 

  29. Ishay, M.: The History of Human Rights. From Ancient Times to the Globalization. University of California Press, Berkeley (2008)

    Google Scholar 

  30. Gordon, J.-S., Tavera-Salyutov, F.: Remarks on disability rights legislation Equality, Diversity and Inclusion. An Int. J. 37(5), 506–526 (2018)

    Google Scholar 

  31. Francione, G.L.: Animals as Persons. Essay on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation. Columbia University Press, New York (2009)

    Google Scholar 

  32. Stone, C.D.: Should trees have standing? Toward legal rights for natural objects. S. Cal. Law Rev. 45, 450–501 (1972)

    Google Scholar 

  33. Stone, C.D.: Should Trees Have Standing? Law, Morality and the Environment. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2010)

    Google Scholar 

  34. Kamm, F.: Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2007)

    Book  Google Scholar 

  35. Levy, D.: The Evolution of Human-Robot Relationships. Love and Sex with Robots. HarperCollins Publishers, New York (2007)

    Google Scholar 

  36. Gunkel, D.J.: The Machine Question: Critical Perspectives on AI, Robots, and Ethics. MIT Press, Cambridge (2012)

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Funding

This research is funded by the European Social Fund according to the activity ‘Improvement of researchers’ qualification by implementing world-class R&D projects of Measure No. 09.3.3-LMT-K-712.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Vytautas Magnus University, V. Putvinskio g. 23 (R 306), LT-44243, Kaunas, Lithuania

    John-Stewart Gordon

  2. Faculty of Law, Vytautas Magnus University, V. Putvinskio g. 23 (R 306), LT-44243, Kaunas, Lithuania

    John-Stewart Gordon

  3. Faculty of Law, Vytautas Magnus University, Jonavos g. 66, LT-44138, Kaunas, Lithuania

    Ausrine Pasvenskiene

Authors
  1. John-Stewart Gordon
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author inPubMed Google Scholar

  2. Ausrine Pasvenskiene
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author inPubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to John-Stewart Gordon.

Ethics declarations

Conflict of interest

On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that there is no conflict of interest.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Gordon, JS., Pasvenskiene, A. Human rights for robots? A literature review. AI Ethics 1, 579–591 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-021-00050-7

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-021-00050-7

Keywords