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Toward a safe MLOps process for the continuous development and safety assurance of ML-based systems in the railway domain

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Abstract

Traditional automation technologies alone are not sufficient to enable driverless operation of trains (called Grade of Automation (GoA) 4) on non-restricted infrastructure. The required perception tasks are nowadays realized using Machine Learning (ML) and thus need to be developed and deployed reliably and efficiently. One important aspect to achieve this is to use an MLOps process for tackling improved reproducibility, traceability, collaboration, and continuous adaptation of a driverless operation to changing conditions. MLOps mixes ML application development and operation (Ops) and enables high-frequency software releases and continuous innovation based on the feedback from operations. In this paper, we outline a safe MLOps process for the continuous development and safety assurance of ML-based systems in the railway domain. It integrates system engineering, safety assurance, and the ML life-cycle in a comprehensive workflow. We present the individual stages of the process and their interactions. Moreover, we describe relevant challenges to automate the different stages of the safe MLOps process.

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Notes

  1. https://safetrain-projekt.de/en.

  2. https://cloud.google.com/architecture/mlops-continuous-delivery-and-automation-pipelines-in-machine-learning.

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Acknowledgements

This research has received funding from the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (BMWK) under grant agreements 19I21039A.

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Correspondence to Marc Zeller.

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Zeller, M., Waschulzik, T., Schmid, R. et al. Toward a safe MLOps process for the continuous development and safety assurance of ML-based systems in the railway domain. AI Ethics 4, 123–130 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-023-00392-4

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