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Quantum Computing, Digital Constitutionalism, and the Right to Encryption: Perspectives from Brazil

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Abstract

This article examines how the debates on a right to encryption, understood within the framework of digital constitutionalism, may be impacted by the development of quantum computing. An important question is how to ensure that fundamental rights and freedoms in the digital environment are adequately preserved, especially considering that the development of quantum capabilities is likely to occur in a disparate manner between developed and developing countries. For this reason, the article brings as an example the case of Brazil, a country that has a significant history of discussing digital rights and in which the issue of encryption is currently in debate before the Supreme Court. The paper is structured in three main parts, beginning with an overview of the discussions on the idea of a right to encryption within digital constitutionalism initiatives, particularly in Brazil. Next, the article examines how the development of quantum technologies may impact encryption, analyzing both technical and geopolitical repercussions of the race for quantum supremacy. Finally, it assesses the potential impacts of quantum computing on the enjoyment of fundamental rights in the digital environment and examines three different approaches: the development of post-quantum cryptography standards, the adjustment of domestic policies and further development of flexible legal and regulatory strategies, and global cooperation through binding and non-binding legal instruments. To conclude, the paper assesses the specific challenges faced by developing countries, such as Brazil, in connecting the debate on fundamental rights with the new technical and legal issues raised by emerging technologies.

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Notes

  1. These provisions can be found in Article 7, items II and III of MCI: “Art. 7. Access to the internet is essential to the exercise of citizenship, and the following rights are guaranteed to the users:

    II—inviolability and secrecy of the flow of users’ communications through the Internet, except by court order, as provided by law;

  2. The cases under discussion are Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade 5527, which challenges the constitutionality of certain provisions of Marco Civil da Internet that have been used by lower courts as grounds for blocking WhatsApp in the country, and Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental 403, which claims that WhatsApp blocks violate fundamental rights to communication and information.

  3. These include, but are not limited to: (i) Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS)/Transport Layer Security (TLS)/Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), the current protocols for providing layers of security on web browsing; (ii) Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI), which supports the distribution and identification of public encryption keys, enabling users and computers to both securely exchange data over networks such as the Internet and verify the identity of the other party; and (iii) P Security (IPSec), an Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standard suite of protocols between two communication points across the IP network that provide data authentication, integrity, and confidentiality (“Applications and Limitations of Diffie-Hellman algorithm – GeeksforGeeks”, 2020). Other examples of these cryptographic systems implementations are Microsoft developer’s platform, Microsoft Azure (Benari, 2014); WhatsApp’s end-to-end encryption protocol (WhatsApp, 2020); and Bitcoin’s authentication algorithm (“Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm – Bitcoin Wiki”, 2021).

  4. As an example, since the year 2000, the digital certification scheme in Brazil has been running under an IKE framework known as ICP-Brasil (“ICP-Brasil,” 2017). It has a very large and complex ecosystem, composed of certificate and register authorities, including banks, public institutions, and universities, among others. With the digital transformation of public services, the importance of ICP-Brasil is continuously increasing. However, the cost of adapting the current IKE framework to quantum-resistant technologies may be considerable, and the lack of timely adaptation may increase its vulnerability to cyberattacks. This is a problem that may be faced both by public and private organizations, especially in developing countries.

  5. These include TLS, SSH, IKE, and IPsec.

  6. A KEM is a cryptographic primitive that allows anyone in possession of some party’s public key to securely transmit a key to that party. A KEM can be viewed as a key-exchange protocol in which only a single message is transmitted; the main application is in combination with symmetric encryption to achieve public-key encryption of messages of arbitrary length. See Coretti et al. (2013).

  7. The term perfect forward secrecy is commonly used to denote a feature of key agreement protocols which gives assurances that past session keys will not be compromised even if the private key of the server is compromised. One example of a protocol that supposedly implements this feature is the WhatsApp end-to-end encryption mechanism. See WhatsApp (2020).

  8. Side-channel attacks gain information about the targeted cryptosystem by observing its physical processes, such as the processor’s running time, electromagnetic emissions, and cryptographic hardware’s power consumption. See Pfefferkorn (2017).

  9. According to NIST, “ideally an attacker should not gain an advantage by attacking multiple keys at once, whether the attacker’s goal is to compromise a single key pair, or to compromise a large number of keys.” See NIST (2016b, p. 19).

  10. Data Protection by Design is related to the broader concept of Privacy by Design, used at the international level since the 1990s to refer to technological measures for ensuring privacy (EDPS, 2018, p. 4). However, Data Protection by Design refers to specific legal obligations established by Article 25(1) of the GDPR.

  11. It is interesting to note that the provision explicitly suggests pseudonymization as an appropriate security measure to implement DPbD. In 2014, the former Article 29 Working Party presented pseudonymisation as a set of techniques that reduces the linkability of a dataset with the original identity of a data subject, highlighting secret-key encryption schemes as one of those (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party – ART29WP, 2014, p. 20).

  12. Some examples are the OECD AI Principles (OECD, 2019) and the UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence (UNESCO, 2021), as well as the Council of Europe Ad hoc Committee on Artificial Intelligence initiative, which was mandated to examine the feasibility of and potential elements of a legal framework for the development, design, and application of artificial intelligence (CAHAI, 2020). It should also be noted that some initiatives that started with non-binding instruments have been evolving to binding ones, such as the current debates surrounding the European proposal for an Artificial Intelligence Regulation European Commission.

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Correspondence to Miriam Wimmer.

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Wimmer, M., Moraes, T.G. Quantum Computing, Digital Constitutionalism, and the Right to Encryption: Perspectives from Brazil. DISO 1, 12 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s44206-022-00012-4

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