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Hegel and the extended mind

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Abstract

We examine the theory of the extended mind, and especially the concept of the “parity principle” (Clark and Chalmers in Analysis 58.1:7–19, 1998), in light of Hegel’s notion of objective spirit. This unusual combination of theories raises the question of how far one can extend the notion of extended mind and whether cognitive processing can supervene on the operations of social practices and institutions. We raise some questions about putting this research to critical use.

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Notes

  1. One can find this caution first voiced in Wheeler (2006): the parity principle does not “fix the benchmarks for what it is to count as a proper part of a cognitive system by identifying all the details of the causal contribution made by (say) the brain [and then by looking] to see if any external elements meet those benchmarks” (3; cited by Clark). This reading is consistent with the functionalist account that both Clark and Wheeler embrace.

  2. The thought here is not that the information that my attorney looks up counts as my memory even prior to receiving it over the phone. Rather, the idea is that I extend my cognitive problem solving ability by plugging into a system—the legal institution—which extends my thinking as I engage with it. Thanks to Michael Wheeler for raising this issue.

  3. Their focus on the more individual uses of technology may rest on their mechanistic conceptions of the mind in contrast to the more social dimensions we are suggesting here. Clark, for example, conceives of the mind as “mechanically realized by complex, shifting mixtures of energetic and dynamic coupling, internal and external forms of representation and computation, epistemically potent forms of bodily action and the canny exploitation of a variety of extrabodily props, aids and scaffolding” (2008, 219).

  4. Shortly after the final version of this paper was submitted to the journal we came across the following footnote in Habermas (2007). The note is not by Habermas, but a translator’s note by Joel Anderson (n5, 42–43): “The notion of ‘objective mind’ (which stems from Hegel, where it is often translated as ‘objective spirit’) is used to refer to social institutions, customs, shared practices, science, culture, language, and so on—those entirely real parts of the human world that are neither held within one individual’s mind nor physically instantiated independently from humans. In this sense, then, recent discussions within philosophy of mind and cognitive science regarding ‘situated cognition’ or the ‘extended mind’ are also about the ‘objective mind’”.

References

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Acknowledgments

The authors thank Michael Wheeler for comments on an earlier draft. SG expresses his gratitude to Sabine Flach, Jon Söffner and the Zentrum für Literatur-und Kulturforschung in Berlin for support on this project.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences and The Institute for Simulation and Training, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL, USA

    Anthony Crisafi & Shaun Gallagher

  2. Department of Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, Hertfordshire, UK

    Anthony Crisafi & Shaun Gallagher

Authors
  1. Anthony Crisafi
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  2. Shaun Gallagher
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Correspondence to Shaun Gallagher.

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Crisafi, A., Gallagher, S. Hegel and the extended mind. AI & Soc 25, 123–129 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-009-0239-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-009-0239-9

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