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Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games

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Abstract

We study a bargaining procedure of coalition formation in the class of hedonic games, where players’ preferences depend solely on the coalition they belong to. We provide an example of nonexistence of a pure strategy stationary perfect equilibrium, and a necessary and sufficient condition for existence. We show that when the game is totally stable (the game and all its restrictions have a nonempty core), there always exists a no-delay equilibrium generating core outcomes. Other equilibria exhibiting delay or resulting in unstable outcomes can also exist. If the core of the hedonic game and its restrictions always consist of a single point, we show that the bargaining game admits a unique stationary perfect equilibrium, resulting in the immediate formation of the core coalition structure.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau, France

    Francis Bloch

  2. Concordia University, Montreal, Canada

    Effrosyni Diamantoudi

Authors
  1. Francis Bloch
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  2. Effrosyni Diamantoudi
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Correspondence to Francis Bloch.

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Bloch, F., Diamantoudi, E. Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games. Int J Game Theory 40, 263–280 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0237-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0237-7

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