Abstract
We first provide the complete characterization of mechanisms that satisfy weak group strategy-proofness and queue-efficiency in the multiple machine queueing problem with two agents. For any such mechanism, there can be at most one point of discontinuity in the transfer map. We then state a necessary condition for mechanisms to satisfy queue-efficiency, weak group strategy-proofness and continuity, with more than two agents. Finally, we provide a class of mechanisms that satisfy queue-efficiency, weak group strategy-proofness and continuity.
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Mukherjee, C. Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines. Int J Game Theory 42, 131–163 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0326-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0326-x