Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

ɛ-Consistent equilibrium in repeated games

  • Published:
International Journal of Game Theory Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract.

We introduce the concept of ɛ-consistent equilibrium where each player plays a ɛ-best response after every history reached with positive probability. In particular, an ɛ-consistent equilibrium induces an ɛ-equilibrium in any subgame reached along the play path. The existence of ɛ-consistent equilibrium is examined in various repeated games. The main result is the existence in stochastic games with absorbing states.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Mathematical Sciences, Sackler Faculty of Exact Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel (e-mail: lehrer@math.tau.ac.il), , , , , , IL

    Ehud Lehrer

  2. Laboratoire d'Econométrie, Ecole Polytechnique, 1 rue Descartes, 75005 Paris, France (e-mail: sorin@poly.polytechnique.fr), , , , , , FR

    Sylvain Sorin

Authors
  1. Ehud Lehrer
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Sylvain Sorin
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Additional information

Received January 1995/Revised version October 1996/Final version September 1997

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Lehrer, E., Sorin, S. ɛ-Consistent equilibrium in repeated games. Game Theory 27, 231–244 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050069

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050069

Keywords

Search

Navigation