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N-Person stochastic games with upper semi-continuous payoffs

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Abstract.

Every n-person stochastic game with a countable state space, finite action sets for the players and bounded, upper semi-continuous payoffs has an ε-equilibrium for every ε>0.

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Received: January 2001

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Secchi, P., Sudderth, W. N-Person stochastic games with upper semi-continuous payoffs. Game Theory 30, 491–502 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820200091

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820200091