Abstract
We consider the problem of scheduling jobs on related machines owned by selfish agents. We provide a 5-approximation deterministic truthful mechanism, the first deterministic truthful result for the problem. Previously, Archer and Tardos showed a 2-approximation randomized mechanism which is truthful in expectation only (a weaker notion of truthfulness). In case the number of machines is constant, we provide a deterministic Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Scheme (FPTAS) and a suitable payment scheme that yields a truthful mechanism for the problem. This result, which is based on converting FPTAS to monotone FPTAS, improves a previous result of Auletta et al., who showed a (4 + ε)-approximation truthful mechanism.
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Andelman, N., Azar, Y. & Sorani, M. Truthful Approximation Mechanisms for Scheduling Selfish Related Machines. Theory Comput Syst 40, 423–436 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-006-1316-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-006-1316-9