Abstract
An alternative voting system, referred to as probabilistic Borda rule, is developed and analyzed. The winning alternative under this system is chosen by lottery where the weights are determined from each alternative’s Borda score relative to all Borda points possible. Advantages of the lottery include the elimination of strategic voting on the set of alternatives under consideration and breaking the tyranny of majority coalitions. Disadvantages include an increased incentive for strategic introduction of new alternatives to alter the lottery weights, and the possible selection of a Condorcet loser. Normative axiomatic properties of the system are also considered. It is shown this system satisfies the axiomatic properties of the standard Borda procedure in a probabilistic fashion.
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I thank Nic Tideman and Andrew Yates for helpful comments and especially appreciate detailed criticism from Keith Dougherty which greatly improved the exposition of the text. In addition, Don Saari, in his role as editor, suggested a number of clarifications and an important extension for which I am grateful. I accept full responsibility for any remaining shortcomings.
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Heckelman, J. Probabilistic Borda rule voting. Soc Choice Welfare 21, 455–468 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0211-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0211-4