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Rational Choice and von Neumann– Morgenstern’s Stable Set: The Case of Path-dependent Procedures

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Abstract

Describing a procedure in which choice proceeds in a sequence, we propose two alternative ways of resolving the decision problem whenever the outcome is sequence sensitive. One way yields a rationalizable choice set, and the other way produces a weakly rationalizable choice set that is equivalent to von Neumann–Morgenstern’s stable set. It is shown that for quasi-transitive rationalization, the maximal set must coincide with its stable set.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of California, Riverside, CA, 92521, USA

    Taradas Bandyopadhyay

  2. Department of Economics, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, 2006, Australia

    Kunal Sengupta

Authors
  1. Taradas Bandyopadhyay
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  2. Kunal Sengupta
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Correspondence to Taradas Bandyopadhyay.

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Bandyopadhyay, T., Sengupta, K. Rational Choice and von Neumann– Morgenstern’s Stable Set: The Case of Path-dependent Procedures. Soc Choice Welfare 27, 611–619 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0147-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0147-6

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