Abstract
This paper surveys non-cooperative implementations of the core which tell an intuitive story of coalition formation. Under the core solution concept, if a blocking coalition exists those agents abandon the current allocation without regard for the consequences to players outside the blocking coalition. Yet in certain circumstances, these players have an incentive to prevent formation of any blocking coalition; a game analyzed in Lagunoff (Games Econ Behav 7:54–61, 1994) is vulnerable to such circumstances. To obtain all core allocations and only core allocations, a mechanism must either restrict the actions of non-members of a proposed coalition, or ensure that non-members are unharmed by the departure of the coalition. These requirements illustrate the core’s nonchalance toward agents not in blocking coalitions.
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The author gives special thanks to Beth Allen and Andy McLennan for their direction, and gratefully acknowledges valuable discussions with Roger Lagunoff, Hugo Sonnenschein, John Ledyard, Myrna Wooders, Nuray Akin, as well as comments from participants at the 2004 Spring Midwest Economic Theory and the Society for Economic Design conferences and from anonymous referees. All errors remain my own. Partial funding came from National Science Foundation grants DMI-0070257 and DMI-0217974.
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Platt, B.C. Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core. Soc Choice Welf 33, 361–381 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0363-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0363-3