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A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method

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Abstract

In recent years, the Pirate Party of Sweden, the Wikimedia Foundation, the Debian project, the “Software in the Public Interest” project, the Gentoo project, and many other private organizations adopted a new single-winner election method for internal elections and referendums. In this article, we will introduce this method, demonstrate that it satisfies, e.g., resolvability, Condorcet, Pareto, reversal symmetry, monotonicity, and independence of clones and present an O(C^3) algorithm to calculate the winner, where C is the number of alternatives.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Berlin, Germany

    Markus Schulze

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  1. Markus Schulze
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Correspondence to Markus Schulze.

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Schulze, M. A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method. Soc Choice Welf 36, 267–303 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0475-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0475-4

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