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On strategy-proof social choice under categorization

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Abstract

I consider social choice problems such that (i) the set of alternatives can be partitioned into categories based on a prominent and objective feature and (ii) agents have strict preferences over the alternatives. Main results are characterizations of the structure of the strategy-proof social choice functions. I prove that each social choice function is strategy-proof if and only if it is decomposable into “small” strategy-proof social choice functions; one of them chooses one category and each of the others chooses one alternative from a category.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Economics, Fukuoka University, 8-19-1 Nanakuma, Jonan-ku, Fukuoka, 814-0180, Japan

    Shin Sato

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  1. Shin Sato
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Correspondence to Shin Sato.

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Sato, S. On strategy-proof social choice under categorization. Soc Choice Welf 38, 455–471 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0539-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0539-0

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