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An axiomatization of success

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Abstract

In this paper we give an axiomatic characterization of a family of measures of success defined by Laruelle and Valenciano (Soc Choice Welf 27:171–197, 2005) for voting rules.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Applied Economics IV, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of the Basque Country, Lehendakari Agirre, 83, 48015, Bilbao, Spain

    M. Josune Albizuri

  2. Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis I, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of the Basque Country, Lehendakari Agirre, 83, 48015, Bilbao, Spain

    Annick Laruelle

  3. IKERBASQUE, Basque Foundation of Science, 48011, Bilbao, Spain

    Annick Laruelle

Authors
  1. M. Josune Albizuri
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  2. Annick Laruelle
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Correspondence to M. Josune Albizuri.

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Albizuri, M.J., Laruelle, A. An axiomatization of success. Soc Choice Welf 41, 145–155 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0671-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0671-5

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