Abstract
The Banks set (1(4):295–306, 1985) is one of the more important concepts in voting theory since it tells us about the sophisticated outcomes of standard amendment voting procedures commonly in use throughout the English speaking world (and elsewhere as well). While the properties of the Banks set for finite voting games have been extensively studied, little is known about how to find members of this set for majority rule spatial voting games involving possibly infinite agendas. We look at this question for two-dimensional games where voters have Euclidean preferences, and offer a variety of new results that delimit areas of the space that can be shown to lie within the Banks set, such as the Schattschneider set, the tri-median set, and the Banks line set—geometric constructs which we show to be nested within one another.
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Feld, S.L., Godfrey, J. & Grofman, B. In quest of the banks set in spatial voting games. Soc Choice Welf 41, 43–71 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0676-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0676-0