Abstract
The literature on income inequality measurement is split into (1) the ethical approach, from which the Atkinson–Kolm–Sen and Kolm–Pollak classes of indices are derived, and (2) the axiomatic approach, which mainly leads to the generalised entropies. This paper shows how to rationalise, under utilitarianism, the generalised entropies as ethical indices. In this framework a generalised entropy index is consistent with the principle of transfers if and only if the underlying utility function is increasing. This unconventional interpretation explains the strange behaviour of the generalised entropies for some values of the inequality aversion parameter, as identified by Shorrocks (Econometrica 48:613–625, 1980). In that case, the underlying utility function is convex. Then, it provides a solution to escape the so-called Hansson–Sen paradox (Hansson in Foundational problems in the special sciences. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, 1977; Sen in Personal income distribution. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp 81–94, 1978) that affects the standard ethical indices and which corresponds to a counterintuitive increase in inequality as a result of a concave transformation of the utility function. A normalised version of the generalised entropies behaves appropriately after such a transformation.
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Notes
We thus operate in a simplified framework by considering that the situation of an individual is fully described by their income, and that personal welfare is cardinally measurable and interpersonally comparable (see Sen 1976, for a discussion).
Again, continuous differentiability is usually not required. The symbol \(|\!|\) is used to indicate that a divergence measure is different from a distance measure, as it needs to neither be symmetric nor satisfy the triangle inequality.
Actually this property has been introduced by Kolm (1976) and called the principle of diminishing transfers.
From an empirical perspective, one can argue that it is not meaningful to investigate the impact of a utility transformation on the index as most of the applications assume a fixed utility function (and thus a fixed level of inequality aversion). Nevertheless, some papers adopt a dual approach by considering that each country, for instance, is characterised by its own degree of inequality aversion (see Lambert et al. 2003). In that case, inequality comparisons require taking account of these different views on inequality aversion, which makes empirically relevant the Hansson–Sen paradox.
This definition immediately extends to the general case of unequal-mean distributions. We illustrate here the normalisation for the relative generalised entropies \(G_r\) (see Appendix A), where admissible incomes are the strictly positive real numbers, recalling that \(G_r(\varvec{x}) {{\mathrm{=}}}G_{\phi _r}(\hat{\varvec{x}})\) with \(\hat{\varvec{x}} {{\mathrm{=}}}\varvec{x}/ \mu (\varvec{x})\) and \(\phi _r\) as defined in (A.3). Consider for instance that the distributions under comparison are \(\varvec{x}=(1,3)\) and \(\varvec{y}=(2,18)\), such that \(\hat{\varvec{x}} = (0.5,1.5)\) and \(\hat{\varvec{y}} = (0.2,1.8)\). The normalisation is here concerned by the lowest observable reduced income, namely 0.2. Hence one can choose the normalised index \(G_{\phi _r} / U'(0.2)\). For the absolute generalised indices, the same reasoning applies to the centred incomes.
References
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This paper forms part of the research project RediPref (Contract ANR-15-CE26-0004) of the French National Agency for Research (ANR) whose financial support is gratefully acknowledged. It has also been supported by LabEx Entrepreneurship (Contract ANR-10-LABX-11-01). I want to thank Richard Nock for interesting discussions on the methods used in this paper. I am also indebted to an associate editor and three anonymous referees whose comments have helped me to substantially improve the paper.
Appendices
A. Inequality indices with unequal mean distributions
When no restriction is placed on the mean income, indices are obtained from Definitions 1 and 2 by normalising the income distributions. We denote by \(\hat{\varvec{x}} {{\mathrm{=}}}(\hat{x}_1,\hat{x}_2,\ldots ,\hat{x}_n)\) the reduced distribution of \(\varvec{x}\in \mathscr {D}^{n}\) where \(\hat{x}_i {{\mathrm{=}}}x_i / \mu (\varvec{x})\), and by \(\tilde{\varvec{x}} {{\mathrm{=}}}(\tilde{x}_1,\tilde{x}_2,\ldots ,\tilde{x}_n)\) the centered distribution where \(\tilde{x}_i {{\mathrm{=}}}x_i - \mu (\varvec{x})\). By using Definition 1, the so-called Atkinson–Kolm–Sen class of relative ethical indices (Kolm 1969; Atkinson 1970; Sen 1973) is defined by \(I_{r}(\varvec{x}) = I_{U_r}(\hat{\varvec{x}})\), where \(r< 2\) and:
It follows that \(I_{r}(\varvec{x}) = 1 - \Xi _{U_r}(\varvec{x})/\mu (\varvec{x})\). Equivalently, the Kolm–Pollak class of absolute ethical indices (Kolm 1969; Pollak 1971) is defined by \(I_a(\varvec{x}) = I_{U_a}(\tilde{\varvec{x}})\), where \(a> 0\) and:
Hence \(I_a(\varvec{x}) = \mu (\varvec{x}) - \Xi _{U_a}(\varvec{x})\). A relative (resp. absolute) ethical index measures the relative (resp. absolute) income loss resulting from inequality. We also point out that, by definition, the utility functions \(U_{r}\) and \(U_{a}\) are strictly increasing and concave.
By applying Definition 2, the class of the relative generalised entropies (Bourguignon 1979; Cowell 1980; Shorrocks 1980, 1984) can be written as \(G_r(\varvec{x}) {{\mathrm{=}}}G_{\phi _r}(\hat{\varvec{x}})\) with \(r\in \mathbb {R}\) and:
Finally the class of the absolute generalised entropies (Bosmans and Cowell 2010), can be written as \(G_a(\varvec{x}) {{\mathrm{=}}}G_{\phi _a}(\tilde{\varvec{x}})\) with \(a\in \mathbb {R}\) and:
Whatever the values of \(r\) and \(a\), \(\phi _{r}\) and \(\phi _{a}\) are always strictly convex.
The Atkinson–Kolm–Sen (resp. Kolm–Pollak) class is ordinally equivalent to a part of the relative (resp. absolute) generalised entropies class. Indeed \(I_{r} = 1 - \left[ (r-1)(r-2) G_{r-1} + 1 \right] ^{\nicefrac {1}{(r-1)}}\) if \(r\ne 1\) and \(I_{1} = 1 - \exp (-G_{0})\), so that \(I_{r}\) is an increasing monotonic transformation of \(G_{r-1}\) as soon as \(r< 2\). Equivalently \(I_{a} = \ln (a^2 G_{a}+1)/{a}\), so that \(I_{a}\) is an increasing monotonic transformation of \(G_{a}\) when \(a> 0\). This relationship is well-established in the literature. In this paper we provide a new relationship, more transparent, through an original interpretation of the generalised entropies.
B. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
By definition, \(I_{U}(\varvec{x}) = \mu - U^{-1}\left( \frac{1}{n} \sum _{i=1}^n U(x_i) \right) \). Hence we can write \(I_{U}(\varvec{x}) = \frac{1}{n} \sum _{i=1}^{n}\left[ U^{-1} \left( U(x_i) \right) - U^{-1} \left( \mu (U)\right) \right] \). Recalling that \(\sum _{i=1}^{n}\left[ U(x_i) - \mu (U) \right] = 0\), one obtains the desired result. \(\square \)
Proof of Proposition 2
We know that \(G_\phi (\varvec{x}) = D_\phi (\varvec{x}|\!| \mu \varvec{1}_n)\) for any \(\varvec{x}\in \mathscr {D}^{n}(\mu )\). The proof is based on the Legendre duality which characterises Bregman divergences (see Boissonnat et al. 2010). By definition, \(\phi \,: \mathscr {D}\rightarrow \mathbb {R}\). The conjugate function of \(\phi \), denoted by \(\phi ^*\), is defined as follows:
Recalling that \(\phi \) is continuously differentiable and strictly convex, it follows that we also have \(\phi ^*(t) = t\,{(\phi ')}^{-1}(t) - \phi \left( {(\phi ')}^{-1}(t) \right) \). Moreover, it can be shown that \({(\phi ')}^{-1} = {(\phi ^*)}'\) and \({(\phi ^*)}^{-1} = \phi '\). By letting \(F=D_{\phi ^*}( \phi '(\mu ),\dots ,\) \(\phi '(\mu ) |\!| \phi '(x_1),\!\dots ,\!\phi '(x_n) )\) we first notice that, by definition:
Moreover \({(\phi ^*)}(\phi '(x)) = \phi '(x) x - \phi (x)\), and \((\phi '(\mu )-\phi '(x)) {(\phi ^*)}' (\phi '(x)) = (\phi '(\mu )-\phi '(x)) x\) by applying the property \({(\phi ^*)}^{-1} = \phi '\). It follows that:
After simplification, one obtains \(F = \frac{1}{n} \sum _{i=1}^{n}\left[ \phi (x_i) - \phi (\mu ) \right] = D_\phi (\varvec{x}|\!| \mu \varvec{1}_n)\). If now we define U as \(U = \phi '\), one immediately observes that \(\phi ^*= \varphi \) with \(\varphi \) as stated in the proposition. Hence we also have from the definition of F that \(F = D_\varphi (U(\mu ) \varvec{1}_n|\!| \varvec{U})\), which completes the proof. \(\square \)
Proof of Proposition 3
Let \(\varvec{x}\in \mathscr {D}^{n}(\mu )\). We know that, by definition, \(G_\phi (\varvec{x}) = D_\phi (\varvec{x}|\!| \mu \varvec{1}_n) = \frac{1}{n} \sum _{i=1}^{n}\left[ \phi (x_i) - \phi (\mu ) - (x_i - \mu ) \phi ^{\prime }(\mu ) \right] \). By denoting \(U {{\mathrm{=}}}\phi ^{\prime }\) and using the fundamental theorem of calculus, one has \(\phi (x_i) - \phi (\mu ) = -\int _{x_i}^{\mu } U(x) dx\) and \(- (x_i - \mu ) \phi ^{\prime }(\mu ) = \int _{x_i}^{\mu } U(\mu ) dx\), from which the result is deduced. The function \(\phi \) is strictly convex, hence U is strictly increasing. \(\square \)
Proof of Lemma 1
Notice first that:
If \(V \left( U^{-1}(t) \right) \) is a strictly concave function of t then, for all \(s,t \in \mathbb {R}\) with \(s < t\), we have:
Let \(s = U(x)\). After substitution in (B.5), and assuming that \((0 <)\, V'(x) \le U'(x)\), it follows that:
By letting \(t = U(z)\) with \(z > x\), one obtains \(V'(z) < U'(z)\) for all \(z>x\). If moreover there exists \(y \in \mathscr {D}\) such that \(x<y\) and \(V(y)=U(y)\), one immediately obtains the desired result. \(\square \)
Proof of Proposition 4
We first demonstrate that (a) implies (b). Let \(V {{\mathrm{=}}}\psi '\) and \(U {{\mathrm{=}}}\phi '\), and choose any distribution \(\varvec{x}\in \mathscr {D}^{n}(\mu )\). One first remarks that:
It follows that \({\phi _{*}}''(\underline{x}) = {U_{*}}'(\underline{x})=1\). By choosing \(\beta = c - U(\mu )/U'(\underline{x})\) and \(\gamma =0\) it follows that, in addition, \(U_{*}(\mu )=c\). Equivalently we have:
Hence \({\psi _{*}}''(\underline{x}) = {V_{*}}'(\underline{x})=1\) and, by choosing \(\delta = c - V(\mu )/V'(\underline{x})\) with \(\eta =0\), we have \(V_{*}(\mu )=c\). By using Proposition 3, we know that:
and:
Because \(U_{*}(\mu ) = V_{*}(\mu )=c\), by substracting (B.10) from (B.9), one obtains:
From Lemma 1, recalling that \({U_{*}}'(\underline{x})= {V_{*}}'(\underline{x})\) and \(U_{*}(\mu ) = V_{*}(\mu )\), we deduce that \({V_{*}}(x) > {U_{*}}(x)\) for all \(x < \mu \) and \({V_{*}}(x) < {U_{*}}(x)\) for all \(x > \mu \). From (B.11) we have \(G_{\phi _{\star }}(\varvec{x}) - G_{\psi _{\star }}(\varvec{x}) > 0\), or equivalently \(I_\psi (\varvec{x}) < I_\phi (\varvec{x})\). Hence statement (a) implies statement (b). To prove that the converse implication is false, consider two increasing functions U and V such that \({U}'(\underline{x})= {V}'(\underline{x})\), \(U(\mu ) = V(\mu )\), \({V}(x) > {U}(x)\) for all \(x \in [\underline{x},\mu )\), \({V}(x) < {U}(x)\) for all \(x \in (\mu ,\overline{x}]\), and such that U is concave. It follows that \(I_\psi (\varvec{x}) < I_\phi (\varvec{x})\) for any \(\varvec{x}\in \mathscr {D}\), where \(V {{\mathrm{=}}}\psi '\) and \(U {{\mathrm{=}}}\phi '\) (see Fig. 1). Since V is not necessarily concave it cannot be, in all cases, a concave transformation of U (which is already concave). \(\square \)
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Magdalou, B. Income inequality measurement: a fresh look at two old issues. Soc Choice Welf 51, 415–435 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1121-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1121-9