Abstract.
We show that Maskin monotone social choice correspondences on sufficiently rich domains satisfy a generalized strategy-proofness property, thus generalizing Muller and Satterthwaite’s (1977) theorem to correspondences. The result is interpreted as a possibility theorem on the dominant-strategy implementability of monotone SCCs via set-valued mechanisms for agents who are completely ignorant about the finally selected outcome. Alternatively, the result yields a partial characterization of the restrictions entailed by Nash implementability of correspondences.
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Received: 3 November 1997/Accepted: 26 April 1999
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Nehring, K. Monotonicity implies generalized strategy-proofness for correspondences. Soc Choice Welfare 17, 367–375 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050025
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050025