Abstract.
This paper follows van Damme (1986) in presenting a meta bargaining approach that justifies the Nash bargaining solution. But in contrast to van Damme's procedure our meta bargaining game is universal in the sense that all bargaining solutions are allowed as strategic choices in the meta bargaining game. Also our result holds true for any number n of players.
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Received: 31 July 2000/Accepted: 19 March 2001
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Trockel, W. A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution. Soc Choice Welfare 19, 581–586 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100133
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100133