Abstract
We study Nash and strong equilibria in weighted and unweighted bottleneck games. In such a game every (weighted) player chooses a subset of a given set of resources as her strategy. The cost of a resource depends on the total weight of players choosing it and the personal cost every player tries to minimize is the cost of the most expensive resource in her strategy, the bottleneck value. To derive efficient algorithms for finding equilibria in unweighted games, we generalize a transformation of a bottleneck game into a congestion game with exponential cost functions introduced by Caragiannis et al. (2005). For weighted routing games we show that Greedy methods give Nash equilibria in extension-parallel and series-parallel graphs. Furthermore, we show that the strong Price of Anarchy can be arbitrarily high for special cases and give tight bounds depending on the topology of the graph, the number and weights of the users and the degree of the polynomial latency functions. Additionally we investigate the existence of equilibria in generalized bottleneck games, where players aim to minimize not only the bottleneck value, but also the second most expensive resource in their strategy and so on.
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Werth, T.L., Sperber, H. & Krumke, S.O. Computation of equilibria and the price of anarchy in bottleneck congestion games. Cent Eur J Oper Res 22, 687–712 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-013-0295-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-013-0295-6
Keywords
- Network bottleneck game
- Unsplittable flow
- Optimal equilibria
- Complexity
- Price of stability
- Price of anarchy