Abstract
We apply previously developed Chu space and Channel Theory methods, focusing on the construction of Cone-Cocone Diagrams (CCCDs), to study the role of epistemic feelings, particularly feelings of confidence, in dual process models of problem solving. We specifically consider “Bayesian brain” models of probabilistic inference within a global neuronal workspace architecture. We develop a formal representation of Process-1 problem solving in which a solution is reached if and only if a CCCD is completed. We show that in this representation, Process-2 problem solving can be represented as multiply iterated Process-1 problem solving and has the same formal solution conditions. We then model the generation of explicit, reportable subjective probabilities from implicit, experienced confidence as a simulation-based, reverse engineering process and show that this process can also be modeled as a CCCD construction.
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Notes
A “pattern” in this latter approach models an activation pattern [a “cat-neuron” in the terminology of Ehresmann and Vanbremeersch (2007)] over a subset of conditionally jointly activated neurons or, more technically, a class of functionally equivalent (in the context of the overall categorization system) jointly activated subsets of neurons. Such a “cat-neuron” is the colimit, in the construction of Ehresmann and Vanbremeersch (2007), of all such (classes of) synchronous assemblies of neurons that are activated by the same input, the colimit representing a kind of “binding agent” in a hierarchical structure.
Dennett (2017) characterizes Process-1 as relatively inflexible “competence without comprehension” that is available, to varying degrees, to all organisms. Process-2 is, from an evolutionary point of view, more recent and possibly unique to human cognition [see also Evans (2010); Frankish (2010)]. The paradigmatic descriptions in, e.g., Kahneman (2011) can reasonably be tied to cultural theories of ‘duality’, as in the anthropological setting of Nisbett (2003) who compares the traditional modes of Western analytic/rational-based thinking to those of the Asian intuitive/holistic thinking. The warnings of Henrich et al. (2010) are clearly of relevance here.
Barrett (2017) also emphasizes that such allostasis maintenance functions must be universal across animals. The DMN is best known as the primary locus of self-referential rumination (e.g., Buckner et al. 2008; Qin and Northoff 2011) and hence much of Process-2 thought functions that are presumably human specific. Evidence that individual differences in DMN connectivity correlate with genetic differences observable in pedigree studies (Glahn et al. 2010) suggests significant recent evolutionary change. Whether ancient and recent functions of the DMN can be teased apart at the architectural level remains to be seen.
In this respect, Arango-Muñoz (2014) suggests that some epistemic feelings are non-conceptual experiences. An individual need not have to realize specific concepts of certainty or uncertainty in order to have epistemic feelings, such as feeling certain or uncertain about something (e.g., on a dull day an individual may grab at an umbrella before leaving home while thinking about details of her conference paper). In a similar spirit, Proust (2015) proposes epistemic feelings to be both intentional and directional, and thus seen as types of mental affordances that induce a cognitive response, and then determine how to implement it.
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Fields, C., Glazebrook, J.F. Do Process-1 simulations generate the epistemic feelings that drive Process-2 decision making?. Cogn Process 21, 533–553 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-020-00981-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-020-00981-9