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Generic attacks on the Lai–Massey scheme

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Abstract

In this paper we present generic attacks on the Lai–Massey scheme inspired by Patarin’s attacks on the Feistel scheme. For bijective round functions, the attacking results are better than non-bijective round functions for the 3, 4-round Lai–Massey scheme. Our results show that there are some security differences of these two schemes against known attacks. The generic attacks on the 4-round and 5-round Lai–Massey scheme require more complexity than the 4-round and 5-round Feistel scheme respectively. Through the analysis we believe the Lai–Massey scheme has some advantage than the Feistel scheme within 5 rounds.

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Acknowledgments

We thank Valérie Nachef and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and feedback. Yiyuan Luo was supported by NSFC (61402280) and the Key Discipine Funding (Computer Technology) of Shanghai Dian Ji University (13XKJ01). Xuejia Lai was supported by NSFC (U1536101, 61272440, 61472251), and China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (2013M531174, 2014T70417), and Science and Technology on Communication Security Laboratory. Yujie Zhou was supported by Shanghai Science and Technology Innovation Action Plan (No. 15DZ1101002).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Electronics and Information, Shanghai Dianji University, Shanghai, China

    Yiyuan Luo

  2. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China

    Xuejia Lai

  3. Department of Electronic Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China

    Yujie Zhou

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  1. Yiyuan Luo
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  2. Xuejia Lai
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  3. Yujie Zhou
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Correspondence to Yiyuan Luo.

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Communicated by V. Rijmen.

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Luo, Y., Lai, X. & Zhou, Y. Generic attacks on the Lai–Massey scheme. Des. Codes Cryptogr. 83, 407–423 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10623-016-0235-2

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