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Social Choice Theory in HOL

Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite

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Abstract

This article presents formalizations in higher-order logic of two proofs of Arrow’s impossibility theorem due to Geanakoplos. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is derived as a corollary. Lacunae found in the literature are discussed.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Informatik, Technische Universität München, München, Germany

    Tobias Nipkow

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  1. Tobias Nipkow
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Correspondence to Tobias Nipkow.

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Dedicated to Mike Gordon on the occasion of his 60th birthday.

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Nipkow, T. Social Choice Theory in HOL. J Autom Reasoning 43, 289–304 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10817-009-9147-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10817-009-9147-4

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