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Decidability of Equivalence of Symbolic Derivations

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Abstract

We give in this paper an alternative, and we believe simpler, proof of a deep result by Mathieu Baudet, namely that the equivalence of symbolic constraints is decidable for deduction systems on a finite signature modulo a subterm convergent equational theory.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. IRIT, Université Paul Sabatier, 118 Route de Narbonne, 31062, Toulouse Cedex 9, France

    Yannick Chevalier

  2. Loria, Inria Nancy Grand Est, Campus Scientifique, BP 239 54506, Vandœuvre-lès-Nancy, France

    Michaël Rusinowitch

Authors
  1. Yannick Chevalier
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  2. Michaël Rusinowitch
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Correspondence to Michaël Rusinowitch.

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Chevalier, Y., Rusinowitch, M. Decidability of Equivalence of Symbolic Derivations. J Autom Reasoning 48, 263–292 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10817-010-9199-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10817-010-9199-5

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