Skip to main content
Log in

A Qualitative Characterization of Symmetric Open-Loop Nash Equilibria in Discounted Infinite Horizon Differential Games

  • Published:
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The local stability, steady state comparative statics, and local comparative dynamics of symmetric open-loop Nash equilibria for the ubiquitous class of discounted infinite horizon differential games are investigated. It is shown that the functional forms and values of the parameters specified in a differential game are crucial in determining the local stability of a steady state and, in turn, the steady state comparative statics and local comparative dynamics. A simple sufficient condition for a steady state to be a local saddle point is provided. The power and reach of the results are demonstrated by applying them to two well-known differential games.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. Caputo, M.R.: The qualitative structure of a class of infinite horizon optimal control problems. Optim. Control Appl. Methods 18, 195–215 (1997)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  2. Dockner, E., Feichtinger, G., Jørgensen, S.: Tractable classes of nonzero-sum open-loop Nash differential games: theory and examples. J. Optim. Theory Appl. 45, 179–197 (1985)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  3. Fershtman, C., Muller, E.: Capital accumulation games of infinite duration. J. Econ. Theory 33, 322–339 (1984)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  4. Reynolds, S.S.: Capacity investment, preemption, and commitment in an infinite horizon model. Intermt. Econ. Rev. 28, 69–88 (1987)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  5. Fershtman, C., Kamien, M.I.: Dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices. Econometrica 55, 1151–1164 (1987)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  6. Cellini, R.: Lambertini. L.: Dynamic oligopoly with sticky prices: closed-loop, feedback, and open-loop solutions. J. Dyn. Control Syst. 10, 303–314 (2004)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  7. Lambertini, L.: Oligopoly with hyperbolic demand: a differential game approach. J. Optim. Theory Appl. 145, 109–119 (2010)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Negri, D.H.: The common property aquifer as a differential game. Water Resour. Res. 25, 9–15 (1988)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Plourde, C., Yeung, D.: Harvesting of a transboundary replenishable fish stock: a noncooperative game solution. Mar. Resour. Econ. 6, 59–70 (1989)

    Google Scholar 

  10. Arnason, R.: Minimum information management in fisheries. Can. J. Econ. 23, 630–653 (1990)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  11. Caputo, M.R., Lueck, D.: Natural resource exploitation under common property rights. Nat. Resour. Model. 16, 39–67 (2003)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  12. Long, N.V.: Pollution control: a differential game approach. Ann. Oper. Res. 37, 283–296 (1992)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  13. Dockner, E.J., Long, V.N.: International pollution control: cooperative versus noncooperative strategies. J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 24, 13–29 (1993)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  14. Mehlmann, A.: Applied Differential Games. Plenum, New York (1988)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  15. Dockner, E.J., Jørgensen, S., Long, N.V., Sorger, G.: Differential Games in Economics and Management Science. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2000)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  16. Engwerda, J.C.: LQ Dynamic Optimization and Differential Games. Wiley, Chichester (2005)

    Google Scholar 

  17. Cellini, R., Lambertini, L.: A differential oligopoly game with differential goods and sticky prices. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 176, 1131–1144 (2007)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  18. Brock, W.A.: Differential games with active and passive variables. In: Henn, R., Moeschlin, O. (eds.) Mathematical Economics and Game Theory: Essays in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern, pp. 34–52. Springer, Berlin (1977)

    Google Scholar 

  19. Dockner, E.J., Takahashi, H.: On the saddle-point stability for a class of dynamic games. J. Optim. Theory Appl. 67, 247–258 (1990)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  20. Basar, T., Olsder, G.J.: Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory, 2nd edn. Academic Press, San Diego (1995)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to C. Ling.

Additional information

Communicated by G. Leitmann.

We thank a referee for several thoughtful comments that have resulted in a better paper.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Ling, C., Caputo, M.R. A Qualitative Characterization of Symmetric Open-Loop Nash Equilibria in Discounted Infinite Horizon Differential Games. J Optim Theory Appl 149, 151–174 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-010-9779-x

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-010-9779-x

Keywords

Navigation