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Solving the Color Incompatibility Problem

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Abstract

It is commonly held that Wittgenstein abandoned the Tractatus largely because of a problem concerning color incompatibility. In this paper, I solve the color incompatibility problem and argue that the central program of the Tractatus can in fact be accomplished.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA

    Sarah Moss

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  1. Sarah Moss
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Correspondence to Sarah Moss.

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Moss, S. Solving the Color Incompatibility Problem. J Philos Logic 41, 841–851 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9193-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9193-3

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