Abstract
We study a model of a queueing system with two complementary products/services. In our model, there is one M/M/1 system and another facility that provides instantaneous service. The two services are complementary and the customer has no benefit from obtaining just one of them. We investigate the model under various price structures and ownership assumptions.
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AMS subject classification: 90B22, 91A10
The authors are equal in their contribution to this paper. This paper is submitted by the first author to the Tokyo Institute of Technology as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Ph.D. program in the Department of Value and Decision Sciences, and the order of names was chosen in compliance with program conditions. This research was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant No. 237/02).
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Veltman, A., Hassin, R. Equilibrium in Queueing Systems with Complementary Products. Queueing Syst 50, 325–342 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11134-005-1808-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11134-005-1808-3