Abstract
We study a simple game theoretic model of information transfer which we consider to be a baseline model for capturing strategic aspects of epistemological questions. In particular, we focus on the question whether simple learning rules lead to an efficient transfer of information. We find that reinforcement learning, which is based exclusively on payoff experiences, is inadequate to generate efficient networks of information transfer. Fictitious play, the game theoretic counterpart to Carnapian inductive logic and a more sophisticated kind of learning, suffices to produce efficiency in information transfer.
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Huttegger, S.M., Skyrms, B. Emergence of Information Transfer by Inductive Learning. Stud Logica 89, 237–256 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-008-9123-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-008-9123-8