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Privacy-aware searching with oblivious term matching for cloud storage

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Abstract

Encryption ensures confidentiality of the data outsourced to cloud storage services. Searching the encrypted data enables subscribers of a cloud storage service to access only relevant data, by defining trapdoors or evaluating search queries on locally stored indexes. However, these approaches do not consider access privileges while executing search queries. Furthermore, these approaches restrict the searching capability of a subscriber to a limited number of trapdoors defined during data encryption. To address the issue of privacy-aware data search, we propose Oblivious Term Matching (OTM). Unlike existing systems, OTM enables authorized subscribers to define their own search queries comprising of arbitrary number of selection criterion. OTM ensures that cloud service provider obliviously evaluates encrypted search queries without learning any information about the outsourced data. Our performance analysis has demonstrated that search queries comprising of 2 to 14 distinct search criteria cost only 0.03 to 1.09 $ per 1000 requests.

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Notes

  1. We assume that encrypted data are outsourced to a cloud storage. For simplicity we refer encrypted data residing within untrusted domain of a cloud service provider as outsourced data.

  2. Privacy-aware data search is realized by distributing appropriate cryptographic keys to authorized subscribers. Inaccessibility to these cryptographic keys restrains capabilities of unauthorized subscribers to search cloud storage and deduce any information about the outsourced data even if they collude with cloud service provider.

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Acknowledgement

This research was supported by the MKE (The Ministry of Knowledge Economy), Korea, under the ITRC (Information Technology Research Centre) support program supervised by the NIPA (National IT Industry Promotion Agency)” (NIPA-2012-(H0301-12-2001)).

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Correspondence to Sungyoung Lee.

Appendix: Performance evaluation: data tables

Appendix: Performance evaluation: data tables

Performance evaluation presented in Sect. 7 is based on the following data tables. Figure 2 presented the visual representation of Table 2. Similarly, Figs. 3, 4, and 5 are associated with Tables 3, 4, and 5, respectively.

Table 2 Inverted index generation and indexed term encryption time
Table 3 Search criteria encryption and decryption time
Table 4 Query modelling, oblivious query generation encryption and response extraction time
Table 5 Oblivious query evaluation time, cloud server response time and estimated execution cost for 1000 requests

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Pervez, Z., Awan, A.A., Khattak, A.M. et al. Privacy-aware searching with oblivious term matching for cloud storage. J Supercomput 63, 538–560 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11227-012-0829-z

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