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A multi-agent model for decision making on environmental regulation in urban agglomeration

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Abstract

The incomplete enforcement of environmental regulation by local governments will lead to environmental degradation. While the strategy selection for local governments is a complex dynamic system. To explore the evolution law of local governments’ strategies, a heterogeneous urban agglomeration network system is constructed. The interactive law of the two strategies: execution and non-execution, as well as the influence of game revenue and supervision probability on evolution results, are discussed through multi-stage simulation analysis. It found that when there is at least one type of subject whose revenue of adopting execution strategy is greater than that of adopting non-execution strategy, the execution strategy spread rapidly in urban agglomeration and reach a significant and relatively stable dominant state. When the two strategies are in a state of repeated competition, central government can improve the interaction trend them by strengthening supervision, and thus promote the transformation from incomplete enforcement to full enforcement of environmental regulation.

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Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the project supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Number 71972145).

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  1. School of Management and Economics, Tongji University, Shanghai, 200092, China

    Ying Zhang & Haifeng Zhao

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  1. Ying Zhang
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  2. Haifeng Zhao
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Correspondence to Haifeng Zhao.

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Zhang, Y., Zhao, H. A multi-agent model for decision making on environmental regulation in urban agglomeration. J Supercomput 78, 5588–5609 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11227-021-04094-8

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