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Strength of mind: Prospects and problems for a Humean account

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Abstract

References to strength of mind, a character trait implying “the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent”, occur in a number of important discussions of motivation in the Treatise and the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. Nevertheless, Hume says surprisingly little about what strength of mind is, or how it is achieved. This paper argues that Hume’s theory of the passions can provide an interesting and defensible account of strength of mind. The paper concludes with a brief comparison of Humean strength of mind with autonomy.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Cleveland State University, 2121 Euclid Avenue, RT 1932, Cleveland, OH, 44115, USA

    Jane L. Mcintyre

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  1. Jane L. Mcintyre
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Correspondence to Jane L. Mcintyre.

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Mcintyre, J.L. Strength of mind: Prospects and problems for a Humean account. Synthese 152, 393–401 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9005-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9005-4

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