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Just how controversial is evidential holism?

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Abstract

This paper is an examination of evidential holism, a prominent position in epistemology and the philosophy of science which claims that experiments only ever confirm or refute entire theories. The position is historically associated with W.V. Quine, and it is at once both popular and notorious, as well as being largely under-described. But even though there’s no univocal statement of what holism is or what it does, philosophers have nevertheless made substantial assumptions about its content and its truth. Moreover they have drawn controversial and important conclusions from these assumptions. In this paper I distinguish three types of evidential holism and argue that the most oft-cited and controversial thesis is entirely unmotivated. The other two theses are much overlooked, but are well-motivated and free from controversial implications.

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  1. University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK

    Joe Morrison

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  1. Joe Morrison
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Morrison, J. Just how controversial is evidential holism?. Synthese 173, 335–352 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9440-5

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