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The role of context in contextualism

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Abstract

According to a view widely held by epistemic contextualists, the truth conditions of a knowledge claim depend on features of the context such as the presuppositions, interests and purposes of the conversational participants. Against this view, I defend an intentionalist account, according to which the truth conditions of a knowledge attribution are determined by the speaker’s intention. I show that an intentionalist version of contextualism has several advantages over its more widely accepted rival account.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Oklahoma, 455 West Lindsey Street, Norman, OK, 73019-2006, USA

    Martin Montminy

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  1. Martin Montminy
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Correspondence to Martin Montminy.

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Montminy, M. The role of context in contextualism. Synthese 190, 2341–2366 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9975-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9975-8

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