Abstract
“Hard obscurantism” is a species of the genus scholarly obscurantism. A rough intensional definition of hard obscurantism is that models and procedures become ends in themselves, dissociated from their explanatory functions. In the present article, I exemplify and criticize hard obscurantism by examining the writings of eminent economists and political scientists.
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I am grateful for the comments by two anonymous referees.
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Elster, J. Tool-box or toy-box? Hard obscurantism in economic modeling. Synthese 193, 2159–2184 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0836-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0836-8