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Generous or Selfish? Weighing Transaction Forwarding Against Malicious Attacks in Payment Channel Networks

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Abstract

Scalability has long been a major challenge of cryptocurrency systems, which is mainly caused by the delay in reaching consensus when processing transactions on-chain. As an effective mitigation approach, the payment channel networks (PCNs) enable private channels among blockchain nodes to process transactions off-chain, relieving long-time waiting for the online transaction confirmation. The state-of-the-art studies of PCN focus on improving the efficiency and availability via optimizing routing, scheduling, and initial deposits, as well as preventing the system from security and privacy attacks. However, the behavioral decision dynamics of blockchain nodes under potential malicious attacks is largely neglected. To fill this gap, we employ the game theory to study the characteristics of channel interactions from both the micro and macro perspectives under the situation of channel depletion attacks. Our study is progressive, as we conduct the game-theoretic analysis of node behavioral characteristics from individuals to the whole population of PCN. Our analysis is complementary, since we utilize not only the classic game theory with the complete rationality assumption, but also the evolutionary game theory considering the limited rationality of players to portray the evolution of PCN. The results of numerous simulation experiments verify the effectiveness of our analysis.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Computer Science and Technology, Shandong University, Qingdao, 266237, China

    Yi Qin, Dong-Xiao Yu & Xiu-Zhen Cheng

  2. Department of Computer and Information Science, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, Indianapolis, 46202, USA

    Qin Hu

Authors
  1. Yi Qin
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  2. Qin Hu
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  3. Dong-Xiao Yu
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  4. Xiu-Zhen Cheng
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Correspondence to Qin Hu.

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Qin, Y., Hu, Q., Yu, DX. et al. Generous or Selfish? Weighing Transaction Forwarding Against Malicious Attacks in Payment Channel Networks. J. Comput. Sci. Technol. 37, 888–905 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11390-022-2032-x

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