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Leakproof secret sharing protocols with applications to group identification scheme

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Abstract

In a traditional (t, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme, t or more honest participants can reconstruct the secret K. In the reconstruction process, the individual shares and the secret key K are revealed, hence K is shared once only. In this paper, we firstly give the definition of leakproof secret sharing scheme which is composed of a distribution protocol and a proof protocol, then propose two leakproof secret sharing protocols, a computationally secure protocol and an information-theoretically secure protocol. In our protocols, t or more participants can jointly prove that they hold the secret K by using a multi-prover zero-knowledge argument of knowledge. As a result, the secret K will be shared for as many times as desired. Furthermore, each participant can detect the dealer in the distribution protocol from cheating, and any verifier can prevent non-qualified set of participants in proof protocol from cheating. As an example of the practical impact of our work we use our techniques to construct group identification schemes with zero-knowledge.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Mathematics and Information Science, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou, 510006, China

    ChunMing Tang

  2. State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Software Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, 100049, China

    ChunMing Tang

  3. Department of Mathematical Sciences, Clemson University, Clemson, SC, 29634, USA

    ShuHong Gao

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  1. ChunMing Tang
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  2. ShuHong Gao
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Correspondence to ChunMing Tang.

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Tang, C., Gao, S. Leakproof secret sharing protocols with applications to group identification scheme. Sci. China Inf. Sci. 55, 1172–1185 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11432-011-4480-8

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