Abstract
Secret-sharing is one of the most fundamental primitives in cryptography, and has found several applications. All known constructions of secret sharing (with the exception of those with a pathological choice of parameters) require access to uniform randomness. However, in practice it is extremely challenging to generate a source of uniform randomness. This has led to a large body of research devoted to designing randomized algorithms and cryptographic primitives from imperfect sources of randomness. Motivated by this, Bosley and Dodis (TCC 2007) asked whether it is even possible to construct a 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme without access to uniform randomness.
In this work, we make significant progress towards answering this question. Namely, we resolve this question for secret sharing schemes with important additional properties: 1-bit leakage-resilience and non-malleability. We prove that, for not too small secrets, it is impossible to construct any 2-out-of-2 leakage-resilient or non-malleable secret sharing scheme without access to uniform randomness.
Given that the problem of whether 2-out-of-2 secret sharing requires uniform randomness has been open for more than a decade, it is reasonable to consider intermediate problems towards resolving the open question. In a spirit similar to NP-completeness, we also study how the existence of a t-out-of-n secret sharing without access to uniform randomness is related to the existence of a \(t'\)-out-of-\(n'\) secret sharing without access to uniform randomness for a different choice of the parameters \(t,n,t',n'\).
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Notes
- 1.
A source is said to have min-entropy k if the probability that it takes any fixed value is upper bounded by \(2^{-k}\).
- 2.
We use the notation \(X\approx _\delta Y\) to denote the fact that \(\varDelta (X;Y)\le \delta \), where \(\varDelta (\cdot ;\cdot )\) corresponds to statistical distance (see Definition 8).
- 3.
By \(\varepsilon _2=\textsf{negl}(b)\), we mean that \(\varepsilon _2=o(1/b^c)\) for every constant \(c>0\) as \(b\rightarrow \infty \).
- 4.
The version of Hoeffding’s inequality we use here states that if \(X_1,\dots ,X_N\) are independent random variables and \(X_i\in [m_i,M_i]\) for each i, then \(\Pr \left[ \left| \sum _{i=1}^N X_i-\mu \right| >\varepsilon \right] \le 2\cdot \exp \left( -\frac{2\varepsilon ^2}{\sum _{i=1}^N (M_i-m_i)^2}\right) \), where \(\mu =\mathbb {E}\left[ \sum _{i=1}^N X_i\right] \).
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Acknowledgment
JR was supported in part by the NSF grants CCF-1814603 and CCF-2107347 and by the NSF award 1916939, DARPA SIEVE program, a gift from Ripple, a DoE NETL award, a JP Morgan Faculty Fellowship, a PNC center for financial services innovation award, and a Cylab seed funding award. The work in CQT was supported in part by the Singapore National Research Foundation through National Research Foundation Research Fellowship (NRF RF) under Award NRF-NRFF2013-13; and in part by the Ministry of Education, Singapore, through the Research Centres of Excellence Programme by the Tier-3 Grant “Random numbers from quantum processes” under Grant MOE2012-T3-1-009. The work of Maciej Obremski was supported by the Foundations of Quantum-Safe Cryptography under Grant MOE2019-T2-1-145. The authors would like to thank Daniele Venturi for insightful comments.
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A Proof of Lemma 3
A Proof of Lemma 3
Fix an (n, k)-source X and pick a function \(F:\{0, 1\}^n\rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m\) with \(m\le k-2\log (1/\varepsilon )\) uniformly at random. It suffices to bound the probability that
holds for every set \(\mathcal {T}\subseteq \{0, 1\}^m\), where \(\mu (\mathcal {T})=|\mathcal {T}|/2^m\) denotes the density of \(\mathcal {T}\). Fix such a set \(\mathcal {T}\), and let \(Z_x=\Pr [X=x]\cdot \textbf{1}_{F(x)\in \mathcal {T}}\). Then, we have \(\Pr [F(X)\in \mathcal {T}]=\sum _{x\in \{0, 1\}^n}Z_x\) and \(\mathbb {E}\left[ \sum _{x\in \{0, 1\}^n}Z_x\right] =\mu (\mathcal {T})\). As a result, since \(Z_x\in [0,\Pr [X=x]]\) for all \(x\in \{0, 1\}^n\), Hoeffding’s inequalityFootnote 4 implies that
The last inequality follows from the fact that
since X is an (n, k)-source. Finally, a union bound over all \(2^{2^m}\) sets \(\mathcal {T}\subseteq \{0, 1\}^m\) shows that the event in question holds with probability at least
over the choice of F, given the upper bound on m.
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Aggarwal, D., Chung, E., Obremski, M., Ribeiro, J. (2022). On Secret Sharing, Randomness, and Random-less Reductions for Secret Sharing. In: Kiltz, E., Vaikuntanathan, V. (eds) Theory of Cryptography. TCC 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13747. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22318-1_12
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