Abstract
So far, most distributed scheduling systems have been designed for cooperative agents, and are inappropriate for self-interested agents, as for example in inter-firm interactions such as virtual enterprises. This paper discusses issues that arise in extending automated contracting to operate among such self-interested agents. We construct a leveled commitment contracting protocol that allows self-interested agents to efficiently accommodate future events by having the possibility of unilaterally decommitting from a contract based on local reasoning. A decommitment penalty is assigned to both agents in a contract to be freed from the contract, an agent only pays this penalty to the other party. It is formally shown that this leveled commitment feature in a contracting protocol increases Pareto efficiency of deals and can enable contracts by making them individually rational when no full commitment contract can. The analysis is nontrivial because self-interested agents decommit manipulatively a Nash equilibrium analysis of the decommitting game is necessary.
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Sandholm, T.W. Automated contracting in distributed manufacturing among independent companies. Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing 11, 271–283 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008971326005
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008971326005