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Two-person non-zero-sum gamesas multicriteria goal games

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Abstract

In this paper, we propose a new way to analyze bimatrix games. This new approach consists of considering the game as a bicriteria matrix game. The solution concepts behind this game are based on getting the probability to achieve some prespecified goals. We consider as a part of the solution, not only the payoff values, but also the probability to get them. In addition, to avoid the choice of only one goal, two different approaches are used. Firstly, sensitivity analysis of the solution set is carried out on the range of goals, secondly a partition of the goal space in a finite number of regions is presented. Some examples are included to illustrate the results in the paper.

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Fernández, F., Puerto, J. & Monroy, L. Two-person non-zero-sum gamesas multicriteria goal games. Annals of Operations Research 84, 195–208 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018988804013

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