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Deflationary Truth and the Liar

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, 27599-3125, U.S.A

    Keith Simmons

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  1. Keith Simmons
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Simmons, K. Deflationary Truth and the Liar. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28, 455–488 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004382815082

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