Abstract
I sketch an explanatory framework that fits a variety of contemporary research programs in cognitive science. I then investigate the scope and the implications of this framework. The framework emphasizes (a) the explanatory role played by the semantic content of cognitive representations, and (b) the important “mechanistic”, non-intentional dimension of cognitive explanations. I show how both of these features are present simultaneously in certain varieties of cognitive explanation. I also consider the explanatory role played by grounded representational content, that is, content evaluated by appeal to its truth, falsity, accuracy, inaccuracy and other relational properties.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
REFERENCES
Burge, T.: 1979, ‘Individualism and the Mental’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4, 73–121.
Burge, T.: 1986, ‘Individualism and Psychology’, Philosophical Review 95, 3–46.
Cherniak, C.: 1981, ‘Minimal Rationality’, Mind 90, 161–183.
Churchland, P.S.: 1986, Neurophilosophy, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Cummins, R.: 1983, Psychological Explanation, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Davidson, D.: 1970, ‘Mental Events’, in J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory, University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst.
Dennett, D.: 1971, ‘Intentional Systems’, Journal of Philosophy 68, 87–106.
Feldman, F.: 1974, ‘An Alleged Defect in Gettier Counterexamples’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52, 68–69.
Finke, R. A., T. B. Ward, and S. M. Smith: 1992, Creative Cognition: Theory, Research, and Applications, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Fodor, J. A.: 1974, ‘Special Sciences’, Synthese 28, 77–115.
Fodor, J. A.: 1980, ‘Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology’, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, 63–109.
Fodor, J. A.: 1987, Psychosemantics, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Fodor, J. A.: 1990, ‘Making Mind Matter More’, in A Theory of Content and Other Essays, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Geertz, C.: 1973, ‘Ideology as a Cultural System’, in The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, Basic Books, New York.
Gettier, E.: 1963, ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’, Analysis 23, 121–123.
Gibson, J. J.: 1979, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Houghton Mifflin, Boston.
Goldman, A.: 1986, Epistemology and Cognition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Hardcastle, V.: 1992, ‘Reduction, Explanatory Extension, and the Mind/Brain Sciences’, Philosophy of Science 59, 408–428.
Haugeland, J.: 1981, ‘Semantic Engines: An Introduction to Mind Design’, in J. Haugeland (ed.), Mind Design, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Haugeland, J.: 1985, Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Heil, J. and A. Mele (eds.): 1993, Mental Causation, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Horwich, P.: 1990, Truth, Basil Blackwell, New York.
Hull, D.: 1988, The Scientific Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Kitcher, P.: 1988, ‘Marr's Computational Theory of Vision’, Philosophy of Science 55, 1–24.
Lakatos, I.: 1970, ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs’, in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Marr, D.: 1982, Vision, W. H. Freeman, San Francisco.
Montgomery, R.: 1989, ‘Does Epistemology Reduce to Cognitive Psychology?’, Philosophia 19, 245–263.
Montgomery, R.: 1995a, ‘Non-Cartesian Explanations Meet the Problem of Mental Causation’, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 33, 221–241.
Montgomery, R.: 1995b, ‘Explanation and Evaluation in Cognitive Science’, Philosophy of Science 62, 261–282.
Nozick, R.: 1993, The Nature of Rationality, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Perkins, D. N.: 1984, The Mind's Best Work, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Putnam, H.: 1975, ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7, 131–93.
Putnam, H.: 1978, ‘Reference and Understanding’, in Meaning and the Moral Sciences, Routledge, Boston.
Rawls, J.: 1971, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Ryle, G.: 1949, The Concept of Mind, Barnes and Noble, New York.
Salmon, W.: 1994, ‘Causality Without Counterfactuals’, Philosophy of Science 61, 297–312.
Segal, G. and E. Sober: 1991, ‘The Causal Efficacy of Content’, Philosophical Studies 63, 1–30.
Sejnowski, T. J. and C. R. Rosenberg: 1988, ‘Learning and Representation in Connectionist Models’, in M. S. Gazzaniga (ed.), Perspectives in Memory Research, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Smolensky, P.: 1988, ‘On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism’, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11, 1–23.
Smolensky, P.: 1991, ‘Connectionism, Constituency and the Language of Thought’, in B. Loewer and G. Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman: 1974, ‘Judgement Under Uncertainty; Heuristics and Biases’, Science 185, 1124–1131.
Unger, P.: 1968, ‘An Analysis of Factual Knowledge’, Journal of Philosophy 65, 157–170.
Winograd, T.: 1972, Understanding Natural Language, Academic Press, New York.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Montgomery, R. Grades of Explanation in Cognitive Science. Synthese 114, 463–495 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005084615487
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005084615487