Abstract
On the basis of elementary thinkingabout language functioning,a solution of truth paradoxes isgiven and a correspondingsemantics of a truth predicateis founded. It is shown that it is precisely thetwo-valued description of the maximal intrinsic fixedpoint of the strong Kleene three-valuedsemantics.
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Čulina, B. The Concept of Truth. Synthese 126, 339–360 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005237331006
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005237331006