Abstract
To handle epistemic and pragmatic risks, Gärdenfors and Sahlin (1982, 1988) design a decision procedure for cases in which probabilities are indeterminate. Their procedure steps outside the traditional expected utility framework. Must it do this? Can the traditional framework handle risk? This paper argues that it can. The key is a comprehensive interpretation of an option's possible outcomes. Taking possible outcomes more broadly than Gärdenfors and Sahlin do, expected utility can give risk its due. In particular, Good's (1952) decision procedure adequately handles indeterminate probabilities and the risks they generate.
Similar content being viewed by others
REFERENCES
Beebee, H. and D. Papineau: 1997, ‘Probability as a Guide to Life’, Journal of Philosophy 94, 217-243.
Gärdenfors, P.: 1979, ‘Forecasts, Decisions, and Uncertain Probabilities’, Erkenntnis 14, 159-181.
Gärdenfors, P. and N. Sahlin: 1982, ‘Unreliable Probabilities, Risk Taking, and Decision Making’, Synthese 53, 361-386. Reprinted in P. Gärdenfors and N. Sahlin (eds), Decision, Probability, and Utility: Selected Readings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 313–334.
Good, I. J.: 1952, ‘Rational Decisions’, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Ser. B, 14, 107-114.
Jeffrey, R.: 1992, Probability and the Art of Judgment, Cambridge University Press, New York.
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky: 1979, ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk’, Econometrica 47, 263-291.
Kusser, A. and W. Spohn: 1992, ‘The Utility of Pleasure is a Pain for Decision Theory’, Journal of Philosophy 89, 10-29.
Weirich, P.: 1986, ‘Expected Utility and Risk’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37, 419-442.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Weirich, P. Risk's Place in Decision Rules. Synthese 126, 427–441 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005240226961
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005240226961