Abstract
I. A. Kieseppä's criticism of the methodological use of the theory of verisimilitude, and D. B. Resnik's arguments against the explanation of scientific method by appeal to scientific aims are critically considered. Since the notion of verisimilitude was introduced as an attempt to show that science can be seen as a rational enterprise in the pursuit of truth, defenders of the verisimilitude programme need to show that scientific norms can be interpreted (at least in principle) as rules that try to increase the degree of truthlikeness of scientific theories. This possibility is explored for several approaches to the problem of verisimilitude.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Kieseppäa', I.: 1996, 'On the Aim of the Theory of Verisimilitude', Synthese 107, 421–438.
Kitcher, P.: 1993, The Advancement of Science, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Kuipers, T. A. F. (ed.): 1987, What is Closer-to-the-Truth?, Rodopi, Amsterdam.
Kuipers, T. A. F.: 1992, 'Naive and Refined Truth Approximation', Synthese 93, 299–341.
Kuipers, T A. F.: 1996, 'Truth Approximation by the Hypothetico-Deductive Method', in W. Balzer and C. U. Moulines (eds.), Structuralist Theory of Science. Focal Issues, New Results, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, pp. 83–113.
Laudan, L.: 1981, 'A Confutation of Convergent Realism', Philosophy of Science 48, 19–49.
Laudan, L.: 1984, Science and Values: The Aims of Science and Their Role in Scientific Debate, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.
Mäaki, U.: 1994, 'Reorienting the Assumptions Issue', in R. E. Backhouse (ed.), New Directions in Economic Methodology, Routledge, London, pp. 236–256.
Mäaki, U.: 1998, 'The Way the World Works (WWW). Towards An Ontology of Theory Choice', munpublished manuscript, Erasmus University, Rotterdam (forthcoming in U. Mäaki (ed.), The Economic World View. Studies in the Ontology of Economics, Cambridge University Press.
Miller, D.: 1975, 'The Accuracy of Predictions', Synthese 30, 159–91.
Newton-Smith, W. H.: 1981, The Rationality of Science, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
Niiniluoto, I.: 1987, Truthlikeness, D. Reidel, Dordrecht.
Niiniluoto, I.: 1998, 'Verisimilitude: The Third Period', The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9, 1–29.
Nowak, L.: 1980, The Structure of Idealisation: Towards a Systematic Interpretation of the Marxian Idea of Science, D. Reidel, Dordrecht.
Oddie, C.: 1986, Likeness to Truth, D. Reidel, Dordrecht.
Popper, K. R.: 1963, Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge, London.
Popper, K. R.: 1972, Objective Knowledge, The Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Resnik, D. B.: 1993, 'Do Scientific Aims Justify Methodological Rules?', Erkenntnis 38, 223–32.
Simon, H.: 1982, Models of Bounded Rationality, 2 vols., MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Zamora Bonilla, J. P.: 1992, 'Truthlikeness Without Truth: A Methodological Approach', Synthese 93, 343–72.
Zamora Bonilla, J. P.: 1996a, 'Verisimilitude, Structuralism and Scientific Progress', Erkenntnis 44, 25–47.
Zamora Bonilla, J. P.: 1996b, Mentiras a medias. Unas investigaciones sobre el programa de la verosimilitud, Ediciones de la Universidad Autóonoma de Madrid, Madrid.
Zamora Bonilla, J. P.: 1997, 'An Invitation to Methodonomics', in A. Ibarra and T. Mormann (eds), Representations of Scientific Rationality, Rodopi, Amsterdam, pp. 233–51.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Zamora Bonilla, J.P. Truthlikeness, Rationality And Scientific Method. Synthese 122, 321–335 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005269826141
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005269826141