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What In Nature Is The Compulsion Of Reason?

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Abstract

If reason is a real causal force,operative in some, but not all ofour cognition and conation, then itought to be possible to tell anaturalistic story that distinguishes themind which is moved byreason from the mind which is movedby forces other than reason.This essay proposes some steps towardthat end. I proceed by showingthat it is possible to reconcile certainemerging psychological ideasabout the causal powers of themind/brain with a venerablephilosophical vision of reason as the facultyof norms. My accountof reason is psychologistic, social, and consistent with anevolutionary approach to mind. The account preserves thenormativity by deflating it. But I argue that onlysuch deflated normativity has any chance of beingmade naturalistically respectable.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 94305-1901, U.S.A.

    Kenneth A. Taylor

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Taylor, K.A. What In Nature Is The Compulsion Of Reason?. Synthese 122, 209–244 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005280329063

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